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Abstract 
This dissertation studies the effects of public programs that target at disadvantaged 
population. In particular, I examine the effects of these programs on individual well-being and 
whether these programs lead to behavior distortions. The dissertation consists of three essays that 
focus on different policy contexts and different populations. 
In the first essay, I examine the effects of an active labor market program on the labor 
market outcomes of veterans. In the 1990s, the US Department of Defense implemented the 
Transition Assistance Program (TAP) to help military personnel transition to the civilian labor 
market. The program provides career counseling, employment workshops, and information 
briefing on educational and medical benefits through the Department of Veterans Affairs. The 
goal of this study is to measure the long-run effects of TAP on the labor market outcomes of 
veterans. To identify these effects, I exploit variation in program accessibility generated by its 
initial rollout process. Using data from the veterans supplement to the Current Population 
Survey, survey years 2001, 2003 and 2005, I find that TAP improves the labor market outcomes 
of veterans, measured approximately ten years after their separation from the military. The 
effects of TAP on labor market outcomes vary across veterans with different lengths of military 
experience, and these effects attenuate over time. One possible mechanism is that TAP 
encourages use of the GI Bill, a program that provides tuition reimbursement and a monthly 
allowance to attend institutions of higher education. Moreover, the effect of TAP is concentrated 
among participants who, based on self-reports, find TAP most helpful in career related services. 
In the second essay, I examine linkages between Medicaid availability, insurance 
coverage for pregnant women, use of prenatal care and the health outcomes of newborns. 
Medicaid coverage for pregnant women would potentially improve health outcomes of newborns 
 
 
by providing medical services at no cost. At the same time, Medicaid provides an incentive for 
eligible individuals to drop private insurance coverage. I exploit variation from two federal 
Medicaid expansions in mid-1980s, which eliminated the eligibility discontinuity across age 
groups. The main data come from the National Hospital Discharge Survey and the Vital 
Statistics Birth Records. I employ a difference-in-differences method. Findings suggest that the 
expansions led to a relative increase in Medicaid coverage for women from the immediately 
affected age group by a significant 6.5 percentage points. However, up to 60% of new 
beneficiaries would have been covered by private insurance, absent of the expansions. Findings 
do not reveal significant improvement in birth outcomes, or increase in prenatal care utilization. 
In the third essay, I examine the effect of Medicaid on the asset holding behavior of the 
elderly. Medicaid provides coverage for nursing home care to elderly with limited resources. The 
eligibility rule potentially creates an incentive for the elderly to reduce their asset by making 
transfers to children. This study provides empirical evidence for the effect of Medicaid nursing 
home care policy on elderly's asset allocation. I exploit a policy change in 2006, the Deficit 
Reduction Act 2005, which imposed stricter penalty to asset transfer behavior when determining 
Medicaid eligibility. Using data from the Health and Retirement Survey, I employ a difference-
in-differences method. I find that the elderly who anticipated nursing home entry significantly 
reduced asset transfer behavior by 3.2 to 4 percentage points, in response to the policy change. 
The result is robust across demographic groups and more pronounced for the elderly with the 
highest nursing home entry risk. The findings provide evidence of moral hazard in the public 
insurance market: the elderly would game with the system in anticipation of nursing home needs. 
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Chapter 1: Improving the Labor Market Outcomes of US Veterans: The Long-Run Effect 
of the Transition Assistance Program 
1. Introduction  
Each year, the Department of Defense must sustain a viable military force by recruiting 
qualified individuals. The attractiveness of a military career largely depends on the potential 
consequences of military service.1 One consequence that is of particular policy interest is the 
subsequent labor market prospects of veterans. Anecdotally, the effect of military service on 
civilian labor market outcomes is unclear. On the one hand, military service may worsen labor 
market outcomes since military personnel forgo valuable experience in the civilian labor market. 
Military experience may also increase the prevalence of work-limiting disabilities, especially 
among personnel who serve in combat. On the other hand, veterans are eligible for a plethora of 
programs that promote labor market outcomes. These programs include direct job training 
programs, educational assistance programs (commonly known as the GI Bill), and medical 
services delivered through the Department of Veterans Affairs health care system.2 On net, 
several empirical studies find that the overall effect of military experience on outcomes in the 
civilian labor market is negative.3  
                                                          
1 See Hause (1973), Ash, Udis and McNown (1983), Schiller, Kroetch and Flacco (1991), and Borgschulte and 
Martorell (2013).  
2 See Goldberg and Warner (1987); Mangum and Ball (1989) for the tradeoffs between military service and civilian 
work experience; See Bendard and Deschênes (2006); Angrist, Chen and Frandsen (2010); van der Goes and Snyder 
(2012) for the health effect of military service. See Angrist (1993); Bound and Turner (2002) for how educational 
benefits effect labor supply. See Autor and Duggan (2007); Duggan, Rosenheck and Singleton (2010) for how 
disability compensation program affect labor supply. 
3 Angrist (1990), Angrist and Chen (2008) and Chaudhuri and Rose (2009) show that Vietnam veterans suffer a 
persistent earning loss compared to non-veteran counterparts. Angrist (1998) examines veterans who served in 
1980s, and find military service reduced civilian earning of white veterans. 
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To mitigate the potential disadvantages of military service, the Department of Defense 
and the Department of Veterans Affairs gradually extended the scope of career assistance 
programs. One such program – and the focus of this study – is the Transition Assistance Program 
(TAP). TAP was established by Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 1991, in anticipation of the military drawdown following the end of the Cold War. The 
program lasted three to four days, and was designed to help veterans establish a civilian mindset, 
increase job search efficiency, obtain interview skills, and improve job match quality. In 
addition, TAP provided information regarding benefits administered by the Department of 
Veterans Affairs. The empirical objective of this study is to estimate the effects of TAP on the 
labor market outcomes of veterans. 
To identify the effect of TAP, this study exploits variation in TAP availability generated 
by its gradual rollout. Established as a national program in 1991, TAP expanded fully across the 
country over a couple of years. The program was rolled out to cover the greatest proportion of 
the military population in the shortest amount of time. This meant that states with large military 
populations and installations were covered first; states with small military populations and 
installations were covered later. Nonetheless, the program expanded quickly: by June 1991, 50 
major installations established TAP. The number increased to 80 by September 1991, 178 by 
September 1992, and 226 by September 1993. The process created variation in program 
availability across veterans, which was mainly affected by their service location. 
The main data come from the veterans supplement to the Current Population Survey, 
survey years 2001, 2003 and 2005.4 The Current Population Survey covers demographic 
                                                          
4 Survey years 2001, 2003 and 2005 are years that variables used for regression analysis are consistently 
constructed. 
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information, such as race, age, gender and education, as well as labor market outcomes, such as 
labor force participation, employment status, and family income. In addition, the veterans 
supplement asks questions regarding military experience. This information includes a veteran’s 
year of separation, availability of TAP at the time of separation, and participation in TAP. 
The effect of TAP is measured by the association between TAP participation at the time 
of separation and labor market outcomes at the time of the survey. Empirically, I follow a 
covariates-adjusted IV approach, using TAP availability as an instrument for TAP participation. 
The sample is restricted to male veterans who separated from the military in 1990 to 1993. The 
reason for this restriction is that the rollout of TAP, and thus variation in TAP availability, 
occurred predominantly during these years.  
I find that TAP improved the labor market outcomes of veterans, measured 
approximately ten years after their separation from the military. In the preferred specification, 
TAP increased labor force participation by 7.29 percentage points and full-time work by 7.47 
percentage points. With regard to earnings, TAP increased the likelihood of annual family 
income exceeding $40,000 by 12.01 percentage points. 
The effect of TAP on labor market outcomes may be due to an increased awareness of, 
and thus participation in, the GI Bill. This bill provides tuition reimbursement and a monthly 
subsidy to qualified veterans. Depending on the era and length of service, veterans can receive 
benefits through the GI Bill for up to 36 months. Using the veterans supplement from the CPS, I 
show that TAP increased seeking education/training programs by 15.4 percentage points and 
some college education by 14.96 percentage points.  
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There are two concerns regarding identification. First, the likelihood of being offered 
TAP increased with years of military service. Thus, if senior service members outperform junior 
service members in the civilian labor market, independent of TAP, then the effect of TAP on 
labor market outcomes may be overstated. To address the concern, I control for demographic 
characteristics (age, race, high school education, state of residence) and military characteristics 
(length of service, deployment history). The preferred specification includes a full set of 
observed controls.  
Second, TAP was first offered to veterans at large military installations, and installation 
size may affect employment prospects after separation. For example, military installations often 
hire recently separated veterans as civilian employees and contractors. This may generate a 
positive correlation between installation size and labor market outcomes, which in turn would 
generate a spurious, positive correlation between TAP availability and labor market outcomes.  
To address this concern, I use the American Community Survey of years 2003 through 2007, and 
look at the labor market outcomes of veterans separated within the past 12 months of the survey. 
I find that the labor market outcomes of newly separated veterans are uncorrelated with the 
military population of the states in which they separated.  
I extend the main analysis to examine how the effects of TAP vary across different 
subgroups and over time. First, I investigate whether TAP has heterogeneous effects on veterans 
with varied military experience. Findings from subgroup analysis suggest that TAP improves 
labor market outcomes for veterans with different lengths of military service, with varied 
margins of behavior response. Among veterans who served for four years or less, TAP 
participants are significantly more likely to work full-time. Among veterans with longer than 
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four years of military experience, who are closer to retirement age at the time of the survey, TAP 
participants are significantly more likely to remain in the labor force.  
Second, I estimate the short and long effects of TAP, rather than just ten years after 
separation in the main analysis. To do so, I use data from the veterans supplement for survey 
years 1995 to 2010 and focus on veterans separated from 1990 to 1993. According to the results, 
TAP has the largest effect on labor force participation immediately after separation, and this 
effect attenuates over time.    
While the main analysis focuses on the objective measure of labor market outcomes, an 
equally important question is how participants themselves value the program.5 I seek to answer 
this question by comparing one’s subjective evaluation of TAP to their observed outcomes. 
Information regarding one’s subjective evaluation is available in CPS, which directly asks TAP 
participants what aspect of the program they find most helpful. Using such information, I find 
that the effects of TAP on labor market outcomes are concentrated among participants who find 
TAP most helpful in career related services. 
Although TAP is a large-scale national program, few studies examine its effects. A few 
studies attempt to evaluate TAP by surveying participants: Sadacca et al. (1995) conduct a 
survey of 3,000 veterans from all four military branches. Fauer et al. (2014) conduct a survey of 
350 Army veterans. While both studies report participants’ satisfaction with TAP, evidence from 
national representative population is lacking. One study most related to this one is by Heflin et 
al. (2014), who also uses information from CPS. The focus of their study is veterans’ 
                                                          
5 See DiNardo and Lee (2011) for discussion of objectives of program evaluation. For program evaluation that 
focuses on ex-post subjective evaluation, see Kristensen (2008); Eyal (2010) and Smith, Whalley and Wilcox 
(2013).  
  6 
 
participation choice and how participants value the program. This study instead focuses on 
veterans’ subsequent labor market outcomes. 
 This study also contributes to the broader active labor market program (ALMP) 
evaluation literature. Active labor market programs are government-funded programs targeted at 
promoting labor market outcomes for disadvantaged populations. Card et al. (2010) and Kluve 
(2010) provide comprehensive reviews of the literature. While substantial efforts have been 
made to assess the effectiveness of this type of programs, the focus of this study - the 
Department of Defense programs – has received less attention. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: section 2 introduces the history and 
institutional setting of TAP. Section 3 discusses the data source. Section 4 describes the 
methodology. Section 5 presents the results of TAP on labor market outcomes, educational 
attainment and disability condition. Section 6 provides supportive evidence for the key 
identification assumptions. Section 7 provides extensions. Finally, section 8 concludes. 
2. Backgrounds 
2.1 Military downsizing 
The US military experienced a major drawdown after the conclusion of the Cold War in 
the early 1990s. Between 1989 and 1995, more than 110 installations were realigned, 
consolidated or closed. The total number of active service members decreased by more than 
25%: from 2.1 million to 1.5 million (Figure 1). The Department of Defense (DOD) used 
various policy tools aimed at manpower reduction: the majority of the downsizing goal was 
reached by reducing the number newly recruited personnel, referred to as accessions. At the 
same time, DOD increased military discharges by restricting retention (a continued military 
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career after the end of the current contract) and providing monetary incentives to early separation 
(leaving the military before the end of the current contract).  
The substantial downsizing of the active forces forced a large flow of service members to 
move from the military to the civilian labor market within a few years. In addition, the active 
forces were shaped towards seniority: as shown in Figure 2, over time, service members were on 
average older and tended to serve longer in the military. Such a pattern existed for both the 
enlistee and the officer population.  
The increase in military separations raised concerns about the transition from military 
service to the civilian labor market. For some veterans, skills obtained from military service are 
not directly transferable to civilian labor market. For example, 15% of enlisted personnel work as 
members of combat units. Their training involves skills to “maneuver against enemy forces and 
positions and fire artillery, guns, mortars, or missiles to destroy those positions”.6 These military 
occupations do not have obvious counterparts in the civilian labor market. Even for veterans 
whose skills can be used in a civilian setting, lack of experience in the civilian labor market may 
impede a smooth transition.7  
2.2 Transition Assistance Program 
The Transition Assistance Program was established to help veterans with the transition to 
the civilian labor market. Congress passed legislation in December 1989 authorizing a pilot 
project in twelve military sites from six states (California, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Texas, 
and Virginia). These pilot programs began in May or June 1990. TAP was extended as a full-
                                                          
6 Occupational outlook handbook. Bureau of Labor Statistics. http://www.bls.gov/ooh/military/military-
careers.htm#tab-2 
7 See GAO (1994) for a thorough discussion of the transition difficulties faced by veterans, particularly during the 
downsizing era. 
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scale national program in November 1990 by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 1991. The basic curriculum consists of three parts. First, near separation service members 
take a one to four hour pre-separation counseling session that helps them set a transition agenda 
and develop long-run personal and professional goals. The heart of TAP is a three-day 
employment workshop that provides job search assistance: introduction to job search resources, 
help with resume writing, and a mock interview. The final part of TAP is a four-hour briefing 
session regarding benefits through the Department of Veterans Affairs. These benefit programs 
include the GI Bill, which funds higher education and training; Disability Compensation, which 
provides monthly payments to veterans with disability condition caused or made worse by 
military service, referred to as service-connected disability; health care services, which is 
delivered through the VA health care system; and various career assistance programs in civilian 
settings. 
In addition to the main modules, a half-day session (known as Disabled Transition 
Assistance Program or DTAP) is provided to veterans who have a service-connected disability, 
or who are believed to be leaving the military with a service-connected disability. DTAP covers 
information about Disability Compensation, Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (VE&E) 
programs,8 and additional health care services for disabled veterans.  
Military branches have flexibility to modify or extend the original TAP program to meet 
the specific needs of their personnel.  For example, the Army provides additional one-on-one 
                                                          
8 The VE&E program provides comprehensive services to disabled veterans regarding job training, employment 
accommodations, resume development, and job seeking skills coaching. 
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counseling and interactive job training and assistance. The Navy adds a day to three-day 
employment workshop for detailed discussion of veteran benefits.9 
TAP is jointly organized by multiple government agencies: the Department of Defense 
(DOD) is in charge of the pre-separation counseling and logistics control; the Department of 
Labor (DOL) is in charge of conducting the employment workshop; the Department of Veterans 
Affairs (VA) is responsible for the benefit briefing session and DTAP. In 1991, the three 
agencies entered a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which outlined the objectives and 
management arrangements. The MOU was revised in 1994, 2006 and 2013. The Department of 
Homeland Security, the Department of Education, and the Department of Small Business 
Administration also share the responsibility in later years. 
To be eligible for TAP, one needs to be an honorably discharged service member who 
has been on active duty for longer than 180 days, or who served for less than 180 days but whose 
separation was due to a health condition. Eligible service members can seek TAP starting six 
months prior to separation and one year prior to retirement.10 
DOD planned and directed the rollout of TAP to cover areas with large military 
populations first. The primary determinant for a military installation to become a TAP site was 
the number of active service members located in the particular state. DOD collected information 
on the total number of personnel on active duty located within each state and forwarded it to the 
DOL. Based on military population ranking, the corresponding officer from DOL, the Director 
for Veterans’ Employment and Training (DVET), did a polling among state level military 
                                                          
9 The Government Accountability Office report, 2002 
10 Veterans Education and Benefits Expansion Act of 2001 extends the time period from 6 months to 1 year for 
separatees and from 1 year to 2 years for retirees. 
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services to determine their desire to participate in TAP. Based on the initial polling, individual 
installations were selected to establish a TAP program on site.11  
The rollout process generated variation in TAP availability at the installation level, which 
is presented in Figure 3. The rollout process follows two patterns. First, state level military 
populations positively correlate with TAP establishment timing. State level military populations 
are shown in Appendix Table 2. States that have high military population density, such as 
California, Georgia, and Texas, initiated TAP first. States with smaller military population, such 
as Tennessee, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, initiated TAP later. Second, the rollout timing was 
positively correlated with installation size. This is shown in Figure 4, which separately displays 
the rollout timing by installation size. Four out of the six largest installations (with greater than 
30,000 personnel) had TAP by May 1991. Most installations with large populations (with greater 
than 6,000 personnel) established TAP in the first year of the program’s initiation. Most smaller 
installations (with less than 1,500 personnel) established TAP in 1992 or 1993.  
Overall, the rollout was rapid: As of June 30, 1991, TAP was operated at 50 military 
installations within the contiguous US, with 16,543 service members participated in 326 
employment workshops. By the end of FY1991, TAP had expanded to 80 military installations, 
with 430 workshops serving 22,804 participants. By the end of FY1992, it had expanded to 178 
major sites.12 By the end of FY1993, all major installations in the contiguous US offered TAP.13 
                                                          
11 Congressional hearing, 1991 
12 Congressional hearing, multiple years 
13 At the initial stage, TAP availability overseas was limited. To meet the needs of deployed personnel, DOD later 
expanded TAP program at oversea bases. For service members who are currently deployed, a condensed version of 
TAP was delivered by mobile instructors or through the form of videotape accompanied by the DOL workbook 
(GAO 2002). For service members returning from deployment, the 1994 MOU stated that they have priority in 
attending TAP in domestic installations. 
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Despite the fast rollout, the program was not offered uniformly to all military personnel 
within an installation. One issue was the attitude of commanding officers towards TAP. 
Commanding officers were responsible for identifying near separation soldiers, informing them 
of TAP, and freeing them from daily duty to participate. The Government Accountability Office 
(1994) reports that some commanding officers were reluctant in releasing TAP information 
because they did not want the solders to be distracted from daily duty. Another issue was the 
limited availability of TAP instructors. Before organizing seminars on site, TAP instructors were 
trained at Veterans Training Institution. Shortages of qualified instructors was a frequent issue. 
Finally, interagency collaboration inefficiency intensified the lack of resources. To organize a 
TAP workshop, the DOD needed to report to the DOL the number of eligible service members at 
each base for the latter to schedule workshops accordingly. However, data collecting and sharing 
was largely manually processed in the 1990s. This led to delay and inefficiency in DOL 
personnel allocation.14 According to GAO (2002), after TAP’s full implementation at installation 
level, 50% to 60% of all eligible personnel participate.  
3. Data and sample 
The major data source is the veterans supplement to the Current Population Survey. 
Current Population Survey is a monthly survey of non-institutionalized individuals conducted by 
the Bureau of Census on behalf of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The veterans supplement to the 
CPS is conducted in August every other year. It includes additional questions for the veteran 
population.  
                                                          
14 Logistics Management Institute report, 1997. 
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Two sets of information in the CPS facilitate the analysis of this study. First, CPS records 
the labor market outcomes and demographic characteristics at the time of the survey. This 
information includes labor force participation, hours worked, income, age, race, educational 
attainment, family structure, and state of residence.  
Second, CPS records the historical military experience of veterans, which is asked 
retrospectively. This information includes year of separation, length of service, and receipt of 
medals for deployment overseas for military operation. Importantly, the key variables for 
analysis - TAP participation and TAP availability - are also recorded in CPS. CPS directly asks 
veterans whether they participated in TAP before separation. A follow up question is asked to 
veterans who did not participate in TAP regarding whether they were offered TAP.15 Based on 
the answers to these two questions, I construct a dummy variable for TAP offering: equals one if 
the veteran participated or was offered TAP; equals zero if the veteran did not participate and 
was not offered TAP.16  
The sample used in this study is obtained by pooling observations from survey years 
2001, 2003 and 2005. These years are chosen to ensure that variables regarding TAP are 
consistently defined. The analysis sample is restricted to veterans separated in years 1990 to 
1993. The time period covers one year before the national expansion of TAP to three years after. 
During these four years, DOD administrative records reports 1,425,386 separations. For 
                                                          
15 One caveat with the data is that the questions regarding TAP participation and offering are only asked to veterans 
separated from the military after 1991. For 1990, when the TAP pilot program was in place, participants may be 
miscoded as non-participants. Such measurement error would lead to attenuation bias. However, the miscoded 
population is likely small. CPS from 1995 to 1999 also asked the question regarding TAP participation to veterans 
discharged prior to 1991. According to the responses, the TAP participation rate in 1990 was 0.52%. Additionally, 
conditional on offering, the take-up rate of TAP in 1991 was around 40%. If the take-up rate in 1990 was the same 
as in 1991, four observations from the analysis sample are potentially miscoded as not offered TAP in 1990. 
16 One implicit assumption is one has to be offered TAP to participate.  
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comparison, the corresponding population estimate from CPS is 1,142,844.17 I further restrict the 
analysis sample to male veterans of age 26 to 64 at the time of survey. The restrictions retain 
1347 observations. 
 Table 1 displays a summary of characteristics for the analysis sample, by years of 
separation. Over the sample period, veterans share overall similar characteristics. Two 
differences are worth noting. First, veterans separated in later years are on average slightly older. 
This is consistent with the observation from DOD records that the active forces trend towards 
seniority. Second, after 1990, the share of veterans that were ever deployed increased by about 
20 percentage points, mostly due to gradual separation of Gulf War veterans after 1991.  
4. Methodology 
The empirical objective of this study is to estimate the causal effect of TAP on the labor 
market outcomes of veterans. The effect is measured by the association between TAP 
participation and labor market outcomes, as shown in equation (1). 
(1)  𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ∗ 𝑇𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑠𝑡 
𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 denotes the labor market outcomes of individual i, who resides in state s and is surveyed in 
year t. 𝑇𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑡 denotes whether the individual participated in TAP prior to separation. The error 
term is denoted as 𝜖𝑖𝑠𝑡. 
The major difficulty with causally identifying 𝛼1 is that individuals self-select into TAP 
participation. Participants and non-participants potentially differ on other dimensions that 
determine labor market outcomes. For example, individuals who have jobs lined up or have 
                                                          
17 The CPS population estimate is lower than administrative records primarily because the year of separation 
information is missing for approximately 18.2% of the veteran sample. 
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educational plans prior to separation may find TAP not as helpful and thus choose not to 
participate. If so, the differences in labor market outcomes between participants and non-
participants may understate the effects of TAP. On the other hand, non-participation may reflect 
one’s unwillingness to invest in human capital. This would suggest an upward bias of the OLS. 
Overall, the relationship between the OLS estimate and the true causal effect is ambiguous. 
To attempt to address the individual selection problem, this study utilizes variation in 
TAP availability generated by its gradual rollout: as discussed in the background section, from 
1991 to 1993, TAP expanded at the installation level across the country. The rollout process 
generated differentiation in TAP accessibility, which was driven by veteran’s location rather than 
latent individual characteristics.  
Figure 5 graphically illustrates how TAP offering and participation rates change over 
time. In line with the national level program rollout process, both offering and participation rates 
increased rapidly in 1991 through 1993. After TAP’s fully implementation at installation level in 
1993, both offering and participation plateaued. After 1993, the overall offering rate stays at 
about 70%, and participation rate stays at about 50-60%. 
One concern with using variation of TAP availability at individual level is that, as 
suggested by anecdotal evidence, TAP was not offered uniformly within installations. In 
particular, veterans who served longer were more likely offered TAP due to seniority. At the 
same time, longer time in the military is potentially associated with less civilian work 
experience, more complicated duties (for example, deployment), and an older age at separation. 
These attributes would directly affect subsequent civilian labor market outcomes. 
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Table 2 displays the noted differences in observed characteristics between the group 
offered TAP and the group not offered. Particularly, those who are offered TAP had longer 
military service: the offered group are less likely to serve for four years or less by 18.6 
percentage points. They are more likely to serve for 5 to 19 years and more than 20 years by 9.8 
percentage points and 8.9 percentage points, respectively. The differences in service lengths also 
contribute to significant differences in age: the offered group are on average 0.87 years older 
than the group not offered TAP at the time of survey. In addition, the offered group is more 
likely to have been deployed overseas by 11.3 percentage points.  
To take into account the observed differences, I perform regression analysis to control for 
demographic characteristics (age, race, high school education, whether born native, and states of 
residence) and military characteristics (length of service, deployment). If these characteristics are 
sufficient controls for the probability of being offered TAP within bases, the effect of TAP is 
properly identified. 
To utilize the variation in TAP availability, I follow an IV approach: the constructed TAP 
offering variable is used to instrument for TAP participation. At individual level, the 
accessibility of TAP potentially led to variation in actually attending the program. Such variation 
is used to identify the effect of TAP. The main specification is as follows: 
(2)  𝑇𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑇𝐴𝑃_𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡+𝜇𝑠+𝜇𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑡 
(3) 𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1 ∗ 𝑇𝐴𝑃_𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾2 ∗ 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾3 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡+𝑢𝑠+𝑢𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡 
𝑇𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑡 and 𝑇𝐴𝑃_𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 denote TAP participation and offering for individual i, who resides 
in state s and is surveyed in year t, respectively. 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 includes a set of demographic 
characteristics and military characteristics. Survey year fixed effects are denoted as 𝜇𝑡 and 𝑢𝑡. 
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State of residence fixed effects are denoted as 𝜇𝑠 and 𝑢𝑠. Additionally, I include a set of 
dummies indicating the year of separation, denoted as 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡. The year of separation dummies are 
included to purge year specific attributes that coincide with TAP rollout timing, such as 
macroeconomic condition, compositional change of active military personnel, and Gulf war. The 
causal effect of TAP on Y is identified as 𝛾1/𝛽1. The ratio measures the effect of TAP on the 
subgroup of veterans, whose participation decision is determined by having accessibility.18 
The identification assumption is, conditional on observables, TAP offering and labor 
market outcomes are not correlated through channels other than the causal relationship of 
interest. Specifically, two things are crucial. First, veterans separated from large installations 
(early rollout) do not have systematically different labor market outcomes, compared to those 
separated from small installations (late rollout). Second, there are no other unobserved attributes 
that are jointly correlated with both TAP offering and labor market outcomes. Although the 
assumptions are not directly testable, supportive evidence is provided in section 6. 
5. Results 
5.1 Labor market outcomes 
This section presents results for the effects of TAP on labor market outcomes. Following 
the literature, I mainly focus on labor force participation. I also look at two additional measures 
                                                          
18 I use linear probability models for all analysis in this study. One potential concern is that the outcome variables 
are binary, suggesting non-linear models may be better proxy. I thus check the robustness of results by adopting 
Probit specification for the reduced form estimation. The results from Probit specifications show similar marginal 
effects and statistical power.  
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of labor market performance: whether one usually works full-time and whether annual family 
income exceeds $40,000.19  
Figure 6 graphically illustrates the outcome trends for veterans of three groups: those 
who were not offered TAP, those who were offered TAP, and those who participated.20 The 
trends suggest that veterans who were offered TAP seem to outperform veterans who were not 
offered TAP regarding all three outcomes. However, graphical analysis does not take into 
account observed differences across different groups. I thus turn to regression analysis.  
Table 3 displays results for regression analysis. The dependent variable is labor force 
participation. As a benchmark, Panel A reports the coefficient of TAP participation using OLS 
specifications following equation (1). Panel B reports the preferred IV estimates, following 
equations (2) and (3). In each panel, a series of specifications are performed with various 
controls. The IV estimate in column 1, which includes no controls, shows an estimated treatment 
effect of 4.75 percentage points. Column 2 includes fixed effects for state of residence and year 
of survey. Additionally, it includes year of separation dummies to purge year specific attributes 
that are directly associated with labor force participation. The estimated treatment effect goes up 
to 6.47 percentage points. 
Column 3 and 4 include controls for demographic characteristics. As shown in Table 2, 
veterans who are offered TAP are on average older than those who are not offered. For the 
analysis sample, whose average age at the time of survey is around 40, an older age is associated 
with lower labor force participation. Failure to take into account the observed age differences 
                                                          
19 I check family structure as potential outcomes. Evidence suggests that TAP does not have significant effects on 
veterans’ marital status or the presence of dependent children.  
20 The three groups are not mutually exclusive: those who were offered include participants and non-takers. 
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would lead to a downward bias. Column 3 of Table 3 includes age and age squared as controls. 
As expected, the estimate increases to 7.22 percentage points. Column 4 adds other demographic 
characteristics (race, high school/GED, whether born native). The estimated treatment effect is 
robust. 
Column 5 and 6 further add dummies for lengths of military service and for deployment 
history. The preferred specification in Column 6 suggests that TAP increased labor force 
participation of veterans by a significant 7.29 percentage points, approximately ten years after 
their separation. For all specifications, IV yield larger coefficients for TAP compared to OLS.21  
I use similar specifications to look at other labor market outcomes. The estimated effect 
of TAP on full time work status is shown in Table 4. The magnitude and statistical power are 
similar to those of labor force participation. The preferred specification in column 6 reports that 
TAP led to a 7.47 percentage point increase in working full-time. The estimated effect of TAP on 
family income is shown in Table 5. The preferred specification in column 6 shows that TAP 
increased the probability of family annual income exceeding $40,000 by 12.01 percentage 
points.  
Overall, the effects of TAP on labor market outcomes are large in magnitude. For 
example, the effect on labor force participation is 7.29 percentage points, out of a base of 0.92. A 
few factors may contribute to the large magnitude. First, TAP potentially increased educational 
attainments, which would lead to substantial improvement in labor market performance. Second, 
the sampled veterans are of varied ages at the time of survey. I show in later extensions that the 
                                                          
21 See Appendix for further discussion. 
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labor force participation results are primarily driven by veterans near retirement age, who are 
more likely alter labor supply decisions.  
5.2 VA benefits utilization 
 An important component of TAP is the information briefing session regarding benefits 
through the Department of Veterans Affairs. If TAP increases the awareness of the educational 
and medical benefits, participants are potentially more like to claim the benefits.22 Their labor 
market outcomes would be indirectly affected. For example, if veterans increase the use of GI 
Bill, their educational attainment would increase, leading to improved labor market outcomes. 
On the other hand, veterans may also increase the claim of Disability Compensation, which 
offers a monthly payment to veterans with service-connected disability. Such monetary payment 
is potentially a disincentive to work. This section examines whether TAP facilitates VA benefit 
utilization, as possible mechanism by which labor market outcomes are affected.  
I focus on three outcomes to measure VA benefit utilization. First, I focus on whether the 
veteran ever sought formal job training or job-related schooling after separation. 23 This indicator 
is used as a proxy for using the GI Bill. Second, I focus on whether veterans increase educational 
                                                          
22 According to the National Survey of Veterans (2010), veterans being unaware of entitled benefits or finding 
application processes difficult are major barriers for benefit utilization. Notably, large share of veterans served on 
the active duty between 1975 and 1990 report that they have little understanding of VA benefits. The shares that 
indicated “not at all” to questions regarding how much they understood the benefits are: 40.7% for health care 
benefit; 42.6% for education and training benefits; 58.6% for life insurance benefits; and 32.1% for home loan 
guaranty benefits. 
23 The training/educational program asked in CPS were specified as “Any high school, college-or graduate-level 
course work taken to improve job prospects, knowledge, or skills DOES COUNT as formal job training.” 
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attainment, measured by whether one ever obtained some college education.24 Finally, I focus on 
whether the veteran self-report having service-connected disability.25 
Figure 7 shows the outcome trends for veterans of the three groups: those who were not 
offered TAP, those who were offered TAP, and those who participated. The graphical trends 
suggest that veterans who were offered TAP seem to be more likely to obtain college education, 
to seek education/training, and to report having service-connected disability conditions. Again, I 
turn to regression analysis to adjust for differences in observed characteristics.  
I follow the same specifications as in the previous section. Results regarding seeking 
education/training program after separation are shown in Table 6. The preferred specifications 
using IV are shown in Panel B. Column 1 reports that TAP increased seeking education or 
training by 11.18 percentage points when no controls are included. Column 2 includes state fixed 
effects, time of survey fixed effects and dummies for year of separation, and reports a slightly 
higher treatment effect. Columns 3 and 4 include age and other demographic characteristics. The 
coefficient for TAP increases when demographic characteristics are added. One possible 
explanation is that older veterans have less incentive to obtain education/training because they 
expect lower cumulative return to education. Such pattern is consistent with Heckman and Smith 
(2003), who find lower Job Training Partnership Act enrollment among older adults. Meanwhile, 
veterans’ ages are positively correlated with TAP offering. Controlling for age would increase 
the estimated effect of TAP. Column 5 and 6 further add military characteristics. The preferred 
                                                          
24 VA educational benefits are mostly used for college education, In FY2002, 91.3% of GI Bill beneficiaries use it 
for undergraduate education (83.3%), graduate education (4.1%) or a college with no degree (3.9%). Veterans 
Benefits Annual Benefits Report, Department of Veterans Affairs, 2003. 
25 The self-reported disabled population estimates match with administrative records from the Veterans Benefits 
Administration. 
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specification in column 6 reports that TAP increased seeking education or training program by 
15.4 percentage points. 
Results regarding having some college education are shown in Table 7. The preferred 
specifications using IV are shown in Panel B. Column 1 reports that TAP increases college 
education by 15.94 percentage points when no controls are included. Column 2 includes state 
fixed effects, time of survey fixed effects and dummies for year of separation. Column 3 and 4 
include controls for age and other demographic characteristics. Column 5 and 6 further include 
controls for characteristics of military experience. The coefficient of TAP is robust. The 
preferred specification in Column 6 suggests TAP increased some college education by 14.96 
percentage points.  
Results regarding having a service-connected disability are shown in Table 8. The 
preferred specifications using IV are shown in Panel B. Column 1 shows that, with no controls, 
TAP significantly increases service-connected disability claims. However, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that service-connected disability have a higher prevalence as one serves longer, and the 
service lengths are also positively correlated with TAP offering. The rest of Table 8 reveals that 
the magnitudes of the coefficients of TAP shrinks significantly as controls are added. The 
preferred specification in column 6 shows that TAP did not have significant effect on the 
disability onset for veterans. Longer service in the military and being deployed have significant 
positive correlations with service-connected disability. 
Overall, the results suggest that TAP increased veterans’ educational attainment, 
plausibly by encouraging them to use the GI Bill. However, TAP did not seem to increase claims 
for service-connected disability. The increased educational attainment potentially contributes to 
the improvement in labor market outcomes shown in previous section. 
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6. Discussion of identification assumptions  
This study identifies the effect of TAP by exploiting variation in TAP availability 
generated by the program rollout at the installation level. To establish causal interpretation, two 
assumptions are essential: first, veterans separated from large installations (early rollout) and 
veterans separated from small installations (late rollout) do not differ systematically in labor 
market outcomes. Second, the estimated effects of TAP are not driven by other unobserved 
differences between those offered TAP and those not offered. This section provides supportive 
evidence for these assumptions. 
6.1 Veterans from large vs. small installations 
Large and small installations differ. Large installations are more complex in function, 
more likely to consist of multiple military branches, and more likely to be substantial component 
of the local economy. On the other hand, small installations usually have more specific function, 
and are less likely to affect or be affected by the local community (Zou 2014). Such differences 
yield two potential threats to identification. 
First, military population density may be correlated with transition difficulty. Military 
installations often hire newly separated veterans as civilian employees or contractors to support 
daily operation. Such job opportunities are potentially more concentrated in areas with large 
military populations. If so, veterans separated from areas with large military installations, who 
also had earlier access to TAP, may have a better chance to find a job. The effects of TAP on 
labor market outcomes would be overstated. 
To address the concern, I directly examine whether the labor market performance of 
newly separated veterans are correlated with the size of local military population. I draw 
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information from the American Community Survey for years from 2003 through 2007. Newly 
separated veterans are identified as those who report being on active duty during the past 12 
months, but are not on active duty at the time of the survey. For each observation, the ACS 
records their states of residence one year ago, which are used as indicators for the states in which 
they separated. The state level military population is drawn from the DOD demographic report of 
2004. 
Figure 8 graphically illustrates the relationship between the outcomes of interest and 
state level military population. For each outcome of interest (labor force participation, full-time 
work, college education), I plot the sample mean outcomes and state level military population 
against the states of separation. No systematic differences in outcomes seem to exist between 
states with large military population and states with small military population.  
To quantify any potential association between labor market outcomes and military 
population density, I further perform covariate-adjusted regression analysis as follows: 
(4)  𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ∗ 𝑚𝑖𝑙_𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑠 + 𝛼2 ∗ 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡+𝜂𝑠+𝜂𝑡 + 𝜉𝑖𝑠𝑡 
𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 denote the outcomes of interest. State level military population is denoted as 𝑚𝑖𝑙_𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑠. 
Additional controls include individual characteristics, 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡, state fixed effects, 𝜂𝑠, and year of 
survey fixed effects, 𝜂𝑡. The coefficients are reported in Table 9. Panel A focuses on labor force 
participation. Column 1 reports the simple correlation with no controls. Column 2 includes a full 
set of controls. In both regressions, state level military population has little impact, which is not 
statistically different from zero, on labor force participation. Panel B and C show results using 
the same specification for full-time work and college education. None of the regressions reveals 
significant correlation between outcomes and military population. These results suggest that 
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military population density is not directly correlated with labor market outcomes or educational 
attainment among newly separated veterans.26 
The second concern is that the ACS only reports veteran outcomes in the early 2000s. 
The studied period, the defense-downsizing era, may have further complications. For example, 
the military downsizing may have hurt the local economy more severely for communities with 
large installations. If so, veterans discharged from the large installations potentially faced a 
worse local economic condition and greater difficulty in finding a job. These veterans also 
tended to have earlier access to TAP. This would lead to a downward bias of estimated effect of 
TAP on labor market outcomes.   
Though not directly testable, this hypothesis is not supported by previous literature. 
RAND (1996) suggests that military bases closure (the most severe case of downsizing 
procedure) did not translate into significant adverse shock to local labor market. The 
Congressional Research Service (1997) documents substantial federal efforts to assist local 
communities, local workers and businesses that were affected by base closure. As a result, 
relatively few communities that experienced base closure or realignment had unemployment 
rates above national average as of July 1995. Thus, the downsizing did not seem to create 
systematic difference in local economic conditions.  
6.2 Unobserved military characteristics  
One additional concern with the identification is that unobserved military characteristics 
may drive the results instead of TAP, if these unobserved characteristics are jointly correlated 
                                                          
26 For all three outcomes, the point estimates from the preferred specification (one with controls) have negative 
signs. This suggests that, even if the point estimates are taken as the true correlation, a larger state level military 
population is associated with worse outcomes of veterans.  
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with TAP offering and outcomes of interest. Two unobserved characteristics that may be directly 
correlated with labor market outcomes are branch of service and whether the military service is 
the result of being called up from the reserve. Veterans from different military branches tend to 
differ in skills trained and thus potentially perform differently in the subsequent civilian labor 
market. As for reserve status, activated reservists often have the option to return to previous 
employment after service. They would potentially have higher labor force attachment than those 
who were not reservists. To address the issue, I preform robustness checks by restricting the 
analysis sample to a group of veterans for whom the above concerns are less severe.  
The correlation between TAP rollout timing and the service branch of the installation are 
shown in panel A of Figure 9, which separately displays for each military branch the number of 
installations that have TAP by the end of each fiscal year. A disproportionally large number of 
the Air Forces installations established TAP in 1991. In other years, the rollout at installation 
level has similar pattern across branches. Thus, if the rollout timing differences across different 
branches were instead driving the results, we would expect the estimated effects to be most 
pronounced in 1991. 
For reserve status, I examine whether the reservists contribute to a large share of the 
analysis sample. Figure 9, panel B shows the proportion of veterans whose most recent active 
duty experience was the result of being called up from the Reserve/National Guard by veterans’ 
year of separation. This information come from the veterans supplement to the CPS of years 
2007, 2009, and 2010. The share of this type of veterans was low (around 5%) except for in 
1991, the year of the Operation Desert Storm. Such pattern suggests that, if the outcome 
differences of reservists and non-reservists were instead driving the results, we would expect the 
estimated effect to be most pronounced in 1991. 
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Thus, one natural way to check if the unobserved characteristics are driving the result is 
to exclude from analysis sample veterans who separated in 1991. I repeat regression analysis 
with the restricted sample, and find that all estimation results are robust (Table 10). Findings 
support that, although having unobserved characteristics remains a limitation, branch of service 
and reserve status are unlikely driving the results. 
7. Extensions 
7.1 Do the effects of TAP differ across subgroups? 
Thus far, all analysis focuses on the pooled sample of veterans of different lengths of 
service. This section turns to subgroup analysis for robustness checks. I separately estimate 
treatment effects for veterans with different lengths of military service: veterans who served for 
less or equal to four years and veterans who served for more than four years.  
Table 11 shows results regarding labor market outcomes. Each cell reports the 
coefficient of TAP using the IV specification, following equations (2) and (3). Panel A reports 
the effects of TAP on labor force participation. For the veterans who served for four years or 
less, the effect is modest. For the veterans who served for longer than four years, the effect is of a 
significant 9.05 percentage points. Panel B shows the effects of TAP on work full-time. For 
veterans who served for four years or less, TAP increased the full-time worker status by 14.35 
percentage points. For veterans who served for longer than four years, the effect is small and 
insignificant.  
Overall, TAP improves the labor market performance for groups with varied service 
experience. However, the margin of response differs across groups: for veterans with shorter 
military service, TAP significantly increases the likelihood of being a full time worker. For 
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veterans with longer military service, who are closer to retirement age, TAP significantly 
increases labor force participation. 
7.2. Do the effects of TAP differ over time? 
The main analysis focuses on the effects of TAP measured approximately ten years after 
separation. This section focus on the short-term and the long-term effects. A consensus view in 
the literature on active labor market program evaluation is that long-run effect differ from short-
run effect.27 Anecdotally, how the effects of TAP would evolve over time is unclear. The direct 
gain from job search assistance workshop is potentially most effective right after separation. On 
the other hand, the indirect gain from using educational benefits takes time to realize.  
To investigate this issue, I extend the analysis period by drawing information from the 
veterans supplement to the CPS of years 1995 to 2010. CPS follows the same sampling method 
to ensure that a nationally representative sample is surveyed each year. Such sample design 
allows me to focus on the analysis population – veterans separated from 1990 to 1993 - and track 
their labor market outcomes in each survey year. For each survey year, I follow an OLS 
specification as follows: 
(5)  𝑌𝑖𝑠 = 𝜌0 + 𝜌1 ∗ 𝑇𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑠 + 𝜌2 ∗ 𝑋𝑖𝑠 + 𝜌3 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠+𝜈𝑠 + 𝜉𝑖𝑠 
The coefficient of interest, 𝜌1, and corresponding 95 percent confidence intervals are plotted 
against survey years, shown in Figure 10. The graphical trend suggests that the effect of TAP 
was largest right after separation, and attenuated with time.  
                                                          
27 See Card et al. (2010) and Kluve (2010) for comparisons across studies. 
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There are two caveats to the analysis. First, the point estimates from the OLS 
specification do not represent the causal effect of TAP due to the individual selection issue 
discussed earlier. Survey redesigns in 2001 and 2007 prevent me from consistently constructing 
the IV variable and thus impede the preferred IV specification as in the main analysis.28 
Nevertheless, the relative magnitude of the estimates for different survey years provide 
suggestive evidence regarding how the effects of TAP change over time. Second, CPS 
underreported TAP participation during 1995 to 1999. If veterans who benefited less from TAP 
were more likely to misreport, the OLS estimates during these years would overstate the true 
difference between participants and non-participants.   
7.3 Subjective evaluation of TAP 
This section turns to individuals’ subjective evaluation of TAP. While the main analysis 
focuses on the observed outcome such as labor force participation, hours worked, and earning, 
how participants perceive the effect of the program has equally important policy implications. 
Participant satisfaction affects the decision to complete or drop out (Heckman and Smith 1998; 
Philipson and Hedges 1998). Moreover, government bureaucracies sometimes use participant 
subjective evaluations as evidence for program effectiveness.29 Thus, understanding how 
participants value TAP and whether their subjective evaluation reflects their true outcomes is 
essential.  
                                                          
28 Prior to 2001, veterans were not asked if they were ever offered TAP. Starting in 2007, veterans who did not 
participate in TAP were asked to choose from a list of reasons for non-participation. “Not offered” is one of the 
options. However, other options include “commanding officer did not support” or “not offered at base,” which also 
reflect inaccessibility.  
29 In the context of TAP, participants’ satisfaction is documented as evidence for its effectiveness: see Sadacca et al. 
(1995), Logistics Management Institute (1997), and GAO (2002) 
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 I examine how TAP participants’ evaluations of TAP relate to their true outcomes. Such 
analysis is facilitated by CPS’s additional question to TAP participants asking them which aspect 
of the program they found most helpful. I classify participants’ responses into four categories: 
most helpful for career related service; most helpful for offering VA benefits information; most 
helpful for other services; and not helpful.30 For each possible category of response, I generate a 
dummy variable that equals one if the veteran’s response falls into the category, equals zero if 
the veteran responded otherwise or did not participate in TAP. These dummy variables are used 
as indicators of subjective evaluation of TAP. 
I estimate a linear probability model as follows: 
(6)      𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1 ∗ 𝑇𝐴𝑃_𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜃2 ∗ 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜃3 ∗ 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 
+𝜃4 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡+𝜆𝑠+𝜆𝑡 + 𝜍𝑖𝑠𝑡 
The outcome, 𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡, is labor force participation. The explanatory variables include the TAP 
offering dummy, full set of controls, and the subjective evaluation dummies, denoted as 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑡. The coefficients of interest, 𝜃2, measures the extent to which a specific subgroup 
of participants, identified by their subjective evaluation type, contribute to the main result. Table 
12 presents the regression results. As shown in column 2 and column 6, the effect of TAP on 
labor force participation is concentrated among participants who report that they find the career 
related service most helpful.  
                                                          
30 Responses coded as “Helpful: career related” include “Advice on JOB-SEARCH behavior and 
strategies” ”Advice on ways to improve JOB interviewing skills” and “Advice on RESUME WRITING”. Responses 
coded as “Helpful: VA benefits” include “Information on VETERANS BENEFITS” and “Information on 
availability of UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS”. Responses coded as “Helpful: other” include “Importance of 
copying SERVICE and MEDICAL RECORDS” ”Importance of developing a civilian mind-set” and other 
unspecified responses. Response coded as “Not helpful” includes “did not find any advice or information to be 
useful”.   
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Findings provide suggestive evidence that veterans’ evaluation of TAP is consistent with 
their observed outcomes. It is worth noting that this correlation could also reflect an individual’s 
self-justification: veterans who do well in the labor market are more likely to report that they 
benefited from TAP. The self-justification issue is discussed in Smith et al. (2013), who find 
little relationship between Job Training Partnership Act participants’ observed outcomes and 
self-evaluation of program impact. They argue that individuals may have cognitive difficulty to 
rationally predict what their outcomes would be absent of the program. Thus, the coefficients 
obtained in this section shall not be interpreted as causal. 
8. Conclusion 
 In this study, I examine the long-run effects of the Transition Assistance Program on the 
civilian labor market outcomes of veterans. Using an IV strategy, I exploit variation in TAP 
availability during its rollout stage. The findings suggest that the program has been successful in 
improving veterans’ labor market outcomes. Measured approximately 10 years after initial 
intervention, TAP increased veterans’ labor force participation by 7.29 percentage points. One 
potential mechanism is that TAP increased veterans’ use of VA educational benefits, namely the 
GI Bill. I find that TAP increased in veterans obtaining some college education by 14.96 
percentage points, and increased their seeking education/training program after separation by 
15.4 percentage points. Overall, the effectiveness of TAP in promoting transition to civilian life 
and long-run professional development is substantial. 
 Findings in this study highlight the necessity of the DOD’s career assistance programs to 
the veteran population. The upcoming defense downsizing projects an increase in service 
member separation. The Department of Veterans Affairs projects that over 1 million service 
members would separate from active duty from 2014 through 2020 (GAO 2014). Their transition 
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and long-term developments remains a challenge to policy makers. In addition, DOD’s career 
assistance programs are potential policy tools for quality recruitment. Borgschulte and Martorell 
(2013) show that low unemployment rate in the civilian market provide disincentive for 
reenlistment. The end-of-service career assistance system and its long-term benefits would make 
the military a more attractive career option.  
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Appendix. Individual selection: OLS vs. 2SLS 
 As is the case in many program evaluation literature, individual selection into 
participation impedes causal interpretation of simple OLS estimates. Characteristics unobserved 
to researchers, such as cognitive ability or latent preference, are potentially jointly correlated 
with outcome of interest and participation decision.  In this section, I investigate the nature of 
unobserved characteristics, to show how IV estimates are favored over OLS estimates. 
 The analysis is facilitated by additional questions asked in CPS to veterans who were 
offered TAP but chose not to participate. These subgroup is directly asked the particular reason 
for non-takeup. I record the reasons into binary dummies. As shown in Appendix table 1, column 
1, the most cited reasons include having jobs available prior to separation, having alternative 
educational plans, and finding the program useless.  
 Column 2 shows the OLS estimates, which suggest that participants have a 5.16 higher 
labor force participation rate than non-participants. Column 3 includes a dummy variable 
indicating that the veteran reports having a job lined up as the reason for non-takeup. This 
subgroup potentially has a higher labor market attachment, absent of TAP. Failure to take into 
account such selection mechanism would lead to a downward bias. Including the dummy drives 
OLS upward, as expected. Column 4-6 perform similar analysis for other potential selection 
mechanisms. Column 7 includes a full set of dummies, and reports a 6.13 percentage point 
treatment effect. 
 Overall, the results suggests that OLS underestimates TAP treatment effects. This is 
consistent with the reported selection mechanisms. 
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Table A1: Individual belief: reasons for non-takeup; dependent variable: labor force participation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Percentage distribution OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS IV 
TAP  5.16 5.75 5.56 5.07 5.13 6.13 7.29 
  (2.23)** (2.28)** (2.26)** (2.25)** (2.23)** (2.35)*** (3.34)** 
         
Reasons for non-takeup       
Have a job waiting 32.9  Y    Y  
College/training program 15.2   Y   Y  
Think it's a waste of time  16.5    Y  Y  
Did not know or find out too late 4.1     Y Y  
Other reasons 35.9      Y  
         
# of obs 170 1342 1342 1342 1342 1342 1342 1342 
Notes: Sample analyzed include male veterans between age 26 and 64, who report year of separation between 1990 and 1993. Full set of 
controls are included.  Other reasons include: conflict with mission, lack support from commanding officer, unavailable at current military 
base and unspecified reason. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Estimates are factored by 100. Veteran supplement weights 
are used. *, ** and *** indicate significant at ten, five and one percent level, respectively. 
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Table A2: Military population by states 
 Military population  Military population 
California 167,098 North Dakota 7,840 
Virginia 137,681 Nebraska 7,320 
Texas 112,283 Connecticut 7,299 
North Carolina 101,563 Ohio 7,086 
Georgia 70,641 Utah 5,769 
Florida 66,256 Arkansas 5,261 
Washington 53,171 Idaho 4,665 
Hawaii 44,068 Delaware 3,945 
South Carolina 38,361 Montana 3,782 
Kentucky 35,171 South Dakota 3,691 
Illinois 26,702 Wyoming 3,447 
Colorado 25,930 Maine 3,038 
Maryland 25,842 Pennsylvania 2,947 
Oklahoma 23,753 Rhode island 2,683 
Arizona 22,215 Massachusetts 2,413 
New York 18,779 Tennessee 2,335 
Louisiana 17,724 Michigan 1,011 
Alaska 17,601 Indiana 988 
Kansas 16,811 New Hampshire 849 
Mississippi 16,480 Minnesota 691 
Missouri 15,138 Oregon 630 
DC 13,776 Wisconsin 527 
New Mexico 12,018 West Virginia 496 
Alabama 10,295 Iowa 379 
Nevada 9,364 Vermont 60 
New Jersey 7,327   
Source: DOD demographic reports, 2004 
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Figure 1-1: Active service population. 
 
Source: Department of Defense, Defense Manpower Data Center 
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Figure 1-2: Characteristics of active service members. 
 
Source: Department of Defense, Demographic reports. 
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Figure 1-3: TAP rollout at installation level. 
 
Source: Congressional Report, multiple years. 
 
Figure 1-4: TAP rollout: by installation size. 
 
Source: Congressional Report, multiple years; DOD demographic report, 2005. 
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Figure 1-5: TAP availability and participation rate: by year of separation. 
 
Source: CPS veteran supplements: 2001, 2003 and 2005. Sample includes all male veterans who 
reported year of separation, regardless of age. 
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Figure 1-6: Labor market outcomes, by TAP participation status. 
 
 
Source: Imputed use CPS veteran supplements, 2001, 2003 and 2005. Sample include male veterans 
between age 26 and 64, who report year of separation between 1981 and 2000. Supplement weights 
are used.  
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Figure 1-7: Other outcomes, by TAP participation status. 
 
 
Source: Imputed use CPS veteran supplements, 2001, 2003 and 2005. Sample include male veterans 
between age 26 and 64, who report year of separation between 1981 and 2000. Supplement weights 
are used.  
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Figure 1-8: Outcomes by state of separation. 
 
  
Notes: The solid lines show mean outcomes of veterans separated from the 50 states and DC. Data 
come from American Community Survey: 2003-2007. Sampled used for plotting these figures includes 
newly separated male veterans, whose ages are between 18 and 64 at the time of survey.  
The dashed lines show state level military population. Data come from DOD demographic report, 2004.  
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Figure 1-9: Trends of unobserved military characteristics. 
A: TAP rollout pattern: by branch of service 
 
Source: Congressional Report, multiple years. 
B: Share of reserves, by year of separation 
 
Source: CPS veteran supplements, 2007, 2009 and 2010. Sample include male veterans between age 18 
and 64, who report year of discharge between 1981 and 2000. Supplement weights are used.  
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Figure 1-10: Treatment effects by survey year. 
 
Notes: The solid line plots the coefficients (factored by 100) of TAP participation of a linear probability 
model: labor force participation regressed on TAP participation and full set of controls (except for 
deployment history). Horizontal axis shows the survey years used (1995-2010). Dotted lines plot 95 
percent confidence intervals. Supplement weights are used. 
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Table 1-1: Summary of characteristics of veterans, by year of separation 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Age at separation 27.63 28.16 28.69 28.9 
 (8.07) (8.22) (8.25) (8.64) 
Other races 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.06 
 (0.14) (0.20) (0.19) (0.23) 
Black  0.13 0.14 0.15 0.11 
 (0.34) (0.35) (0.36) (0.32) 
HS or GED 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.99 
 (0.17) (0.14) (0.11) (0.10) 
Born native 0.95 0.96 0.94 0.95 
 (0.21) (0.19) (0.23) (0.22) 
Length of service<=4 years 0.59 0.61 0.52 0.51 
 (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.5) 
Length of service: 5-19 years 0.23 0.28 0.33 0.30 
 (0.42) (0.45) (0.47) (0.46) 
Length of service>=20 years 0.18 0.11 0.16 0.19 
 (0.38) (0.31) (0.36) (0.40) 
Deployment 0.33 0.43 0.49 0.50 
 (0.47) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) 
# obs. 267 363 392 325 
Notes: pooled data from CPS vet supplement 2001, 2003, 2005. Observations restricted to male veterans 
between age 26 and 64. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Veteran supplement weights are 
used. 
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Table 1-2: Summary of characteristics by TAP status.  
 Not offered Offered  
  All Participants Non-takers (2)-(1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Age 39.51 40.39 40.79 39.74 0.87 
 (8.47) (8.56) (9.74) (8.25) (0.57) 
Age at separation 27.78 29.63 30.21 28.72 1.84*** 
 (8.22) (8.35) (8.44) (8.14) (0.55) 
Black  0.12 0.17 0.20 0.12 0.05* 
 (0.32) (0.38) (0.40) (0.33) (0.026) 
Other races 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.005 
 (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.20) (0.013) 
High School/GED 0.98 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.016** 
 (0.15) (0.08) (0.06) (0.10) (0.007) 
Born native 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.93 -0.008 
 (0.21) (0.23) (0.21) (0.25) (0.015) 
Length of service<=4 years 0.62 0.43 0.38 0.51 -0.186*** 
 (0.49) (0.50) (0.49) (0.5) (0.034) 
Length of service: 5-19 years 0.26 0.35 0.37 0.33 0.098*** 
 (0.44) (0.48) (0.48) (0.47) (0.032) 
Length of service>=20 years 0.13 0.22 0.26 0.16 0.089*** 
 (0.33) (0.44) (0.44) (0.36) (0.025) 
Deployment 0.41 0.52 0.55 0.47 0.113*** 
 (0.49) (0.5) (0.50) (0.50) (0.034) 
# obs. 902 444 269 175  
Notes: Sample used is pooled CPS veterans supplement in 2001, 2003 and 2005. Observations restricted to male 
veterans between age 26 and 64, whose reported year of separation is between 1990 and 1993. Standard 
deviations are reported in parentheses. Veteran supplement weights are used. *, ** and *** indicate significant 
at ten, five and one percent level, respectively. 
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Table 1-3: Linear probability model. Dependent variable: labor force participation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
A: OLS       
TAP 3.24* 4.58** 5.27** 5.47** 5.19** 5.16** 
 (1.92) (2.22) (2.14) (2.15) (2.24) (2.23) 
B: IV       
TAP 4.75* 6.47** 7.22** 7.31** 7.31** 7.29** 
 (2.49) (3.29) (3.22) (3.24) (3.34) (3.34) 
Age    3.15** 3.00** 3.47** 3.49** 
   (1.23) (1.24) (1.37) (1.37) 
Age squared  -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.05*** 
   (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Black    -4.53 -4.41 -4.37 
    (3.37) (3.40) (3.41) 
Other races   3.54 4.28 4.27 
    (3.47) (3.42) (3.42) 
HS/GED    18.85 17.55 17.56 
    (11.97) (12.11) (12.1) 
Born native   -2.10 -1.24 -1.28 
    (3.77) (3.75) (3.75) 
Deployed     0.63 
      (1.68) 
Length of service      
6 months to 2 years    -1.12 -1.16 
     (4.30) (4.33) 
2 to 3 years    -3.68 -3.82 
     (3.88) (3.95) 
3 to 4 years    -1.72 -1.92 
     (3.79) (3.90) 
5 to 9 years    -4.17 -4.36 
     (4.27) (4.36) 
10 to 14 years    -4.34 -4.53 
     (5.82) (5.86) 
15 to 19 years    5.15 4.96 
     (7.16) (7.27) 
20 years and over    3.18 2.97 
     (5.81) (5.94) 
Year of separation      
1991  -1.05 -0.97 -1.14 -0.60 -0.66 
  (2.59) (2.48) (2.49) (2.47) (2.50) 
1992  -3.01 -3.44 -3.82 -3.70 -3.79 
  (2.89) (2.86) (2.88) (2.97) (3.00) 
1993  -0.62 -1.00 -1.66 -1.79 -1.88 
  (2.79) (2.78) (2.79) (2.81) (2.82) 
State & survey year FEs N Y Y Y Y Y 
# of obs 1347 1347 1347 1347 1342 1342 
Notes: Sample analyzed include male veterans between age 26 and 64, who report year of separation between 
1990 and 1993. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Estimates are factored by 100. Veteran 
supplement weights are used. *, ** and *** indicate significant at ten, five and one percent level, respectively. 
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Table 1-4: Linear probability model. Dependent variable: Usually work full-time 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
A: OLS       
TAP 3.03 4.16 4.80 4.85 4.27 4.05 
 (2.79) (3.06) (2.93) (2.96) (3.00) (3.00) 
B: IV       
TAP 4.56 7.35 7.89 7.79* 7.61* 7.47* 
 (3.91) (4.50) (4.31) (4.34) (4.46) (4.45) 
Age    4.91 4.68*** 5.59*** 5.71*** 
   (1.56) (1.59) (1.69) (1.68) 
Age squared  -0.06*** -0.06 -0.08 -0.08*** 
   (0.02) (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02) 
Black    -3.63 -3.56 -3.23 
    (3.80) (3.82) (3.85) 
Other races   -4.60 -4.01 -4.09 
    (5.69) (6..94) (6.91) 
HS/GED    18.74 16.64 16.76 
    (11.90) (12.18) (11.99) 
Born native   -6.23 -5.60 -5.86 
    (5.69) (5.74) (5.76) 
Deployed     4.45** 
      (2.26) 
Length of service      
6 months to 2 years    3.94 3.66 
     (7.51) (7.53) 
2 to 3 years    2.46 1.51 
     (6.64) (6.69) 
3 to 4 years    1.77 0.32 
     (6.49) (6.55) 
5 to 9 years    -1.84 -3.19 
     (6.76) (6.83) 
10 to 14 years    -0.89 -2.19 
     (8.09) (8.14) 
15 to 19 years    13.31 11.96 
     (9.01) (9.10) 
20 years and over    11.13 9.67 
     (7.93) (8.01) 
Year of separation      
1991  -6.83** -6.59** -6.54** -5.97* -6.39* 
  (3.40) (3.25) (3.25) (3.26) (3.28) 
1992  -6.43* -6.62* -6.88** -6.83* -7.47** 
  (3.52) (3.44) (3.46) (3.48) (3.51) 
1993  -4.43 -4.34 -4.64 -4.85 -5.47 
  (3.71) (3.61) (2.79) (3.63) (3.63) 
State & survey year FEs N Y Y Y Y Y 
# of obs 1347 1347 1347 1347 1342 1342 
Notes: Sample analyzed include male veterans between age 26 and 64, who report year of separation between 
1990 and 1993. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Estimates are factored by 100. Veteran 
supplement weights are used. *, ** and *** indicate significant at ten, five and one percent level, respectively. 
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Table 1-5: Linear probability model. Dependent variable: Family annual income>=$40,000 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
A: OLS       
TAP 8.50** 9.49** 9.52** 9.70*** 8.69** 8.56** 
 (3.48) (3.76) (3.74) (3.69) (3.68) (3.68) 
B: IV       
TAP 11.51** 13.96** 14.24** 14.19** 12.47** 12.01** 
 (4.95) (5.61) (5.63) (5.60) (5.74) (5.77) 
Age    -2.01 -2.41 -1.60 -1.19 
   (1.80) (1.83) (1.95) (1.91) 
Age squared  0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 
   (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Black    -7.42 -7.77 -7.61 
    (4.73) (4.66)* (4.68) 
Other races   -4.97 -5.92 -5.77 
    (7.14) (6.93) (6.93) 
HS/GED    34.87*** 34.89*** 35.48*** 
    (11.55) (11.14) (11.16) 
Born native   -9.34 -9.87 -9.37 
    (7.17) (6.68) (6.61) 
Deployed     2.50 
      (3.01) 
Length of service      
6 months to 2 years    2.52 3.01 
     (10.25) (10.31) 
2 to 3 years    18.54** 18.88** 
     (9.38) (9.45) 
3 to 4 years    12.86 12.31 
     (9.21) (9.33) 
5 to 9 years    8.59 7.74 
     (9.42) (9.56) 
10 to 14 years    4.16 2.84 
     (11.00) (11.11) 
15 to 19 years    14.39 13.65 
     (12.43) (12.45) 
20 years and over    11.58 10.13 
     (10.36) (10.57) 
Year of separation      
1991  -1.55 -1.75 -1.76 -2.09 -2.12 
  (4.35) (4.37) (4.35) (4.35) (4.37) 
1992  -3.48 -3.78 -4.31 -3.64 -3.4 
  (4.67) (4.70) (4.69) (4.66) (4.68) 
1993  -0.59 -1.15 -1.88 1.14 -0.48 
  (4.66) (4.77) (4.77) (4.79) (4.82) 
State & survey year FEs N Y Y Y Y Y 
# of obs 1347 1347 1347 1347 1342 1342 
Notes: Sample analyzed include male veterans between age 26 and 64, who report year of separation between 
1990 and 1993. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Estimates are factored by 100. Veteran 
supplement weights are used. *, ** and *** indicate significant at ten, five and one percent level, respectively. 
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Table 1-6: Linear probability model. Dependent variable: sought education/training after separation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
A: OLS       
TAP 11.48*** 14.07*** 14.88*** 15.09*** 15.11*** 15.02*** 
 (3.85) (4.09) (4.05) (4.05) (4.06) (4.06) 
B: IV       
TAP 11.18** 13.83** 14.95*** 14.93*** 15.45*** 15.40*** 
 (5.06) (5.73) (5.70) (5.72) (5.77) (5.76) 
Age    0.73 0.49 0.08 0.15 
   (1.62) (1.62) (1.73) (1.74) 
Age squared  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
   (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Black    -3.77 -3.92 -3.77 
    (4.54) (4.45) (4.45) 
Other races   -3.09 -3.48 -3.5 
    (6.41) (6.56) (6.55) 
HS/GED    13.82* 15.32* 15.37** 
    (8.33) (8.51) (8.41) 
Born native   -12.20 -11.50 -11.61 
    (7.51) (7.47) (7.48) 
Deployed     1.94 
      (2.94) 
Length of service      
6 months to 2 years    0.87 0.73 
     (10.68) (10.70) 
2 to 3 years    -1.71 -2.14 
     (10.30) (10.32) 
3 to 4 years    2.17 1.52 
     (9.90) (9.92) 
5 to 9 years    6.26 5.67 
     (9.97) (10.01) 
10 to 14 years    -11.45 -12.02 
     (10.37) (10.35) 
15 to 19 years    6.26 5.67 
     (13.63) (13.54) 
20 years and over    -5.83 -6.43 
     (10.81) (10.80) 
Year of separation      
1991  2.76 2.59 2.73 2.53 2.35 
  (4.22) (4.22) (4.22) (4.23) (4.23) 
1992  1.03 0.28 0.04 0.50 0.22 
  (4.35) (4.33) (4.32) (4.31) (4.32) 
1993  -4.48 -5.60 -5.93 -5.54 -5.82 
  (4.68) (4.69) (4.70) (4.71) (4.74) 
State & survey year FEs N Y Y Y Y Y 
# of obs 1340 1340 1340 1340 1336 1336 
Notes: Sample analyzed include male veterans between age 26 and 64, who report year of separation 
between 1990 and 1993. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Estimates are factored by 100. 
Veteran supplement weights are used. *, ** and *** indicate significant at ten, five and one percent level, 
respectively. 
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Table 1-7: Linear probability model. Dependent variable: some college and above 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
A: OLS       
TAP 12.58*** 12.10*** 10.90*** 10.10*** 10.22*** 9.98*** 
 (3.52) (3.70) (3.72) (3.69) (3.73) (3.73) 
B: IV       
TAP 15.94*** 16.84*** 14.91*** 14.83*** 15.11*** 14.96*** 
 (5.04) (5.59) (5.61) (5.64) (5.77) (5.75) 
Age    2.49 2.38 2.84 2.97 
   (1.77) (1.77) (1.89) (1.87) 
Age squared  -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 
   (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Black    -0.22 -0.12 0.23 
    (4.72) (4.73) (4.75) 
Other races   -9.14 -9.00 -9.08 
    (7.09) (7.07) (7.09) 
Born native   -4.42 -4.54 -4.81 
    (7.04) (7.15) (7.16) 
Deployed     4.81 
      (2.96) 
Length of service      
6 months to 2 years    -3.21 -3.51 
     (10.34) (10.30) 
2 to 3 years    -0.18 -1.21 
     (9.75) (9.73) 
3 to 4 years    -3.90 -5.46 
     (9.41) (9.38) 
5 to 9 years    -3.51 -4.97 
     (9.60) (9.59) 
10 to 14 years    -0.63 -2.03 
     (10.56) (10.56) 
15 to 19 years    -8.65 -10.10 
     (13.05) (13.01) 
20 years and over    -3.50 -5.07 
     (10.26) (10.26) 
Year of separation      
1991  2.59 3.16 3.40 3.57 3.11 
  (4.33) (4.30) (4.31) (4.34) (4.35) 
1992  -5.50 -3.94 -3.83 -3.53 -4.23 
  (4.68) (4.69) (4.68) (4.74) (4.73) 
1993  -4.86 -2.48 -2.15 -2.26 -2.92 
  (4.96) (5.05) (5.05) (5.07) (5.09) 
State & survey year FEs N Y Y Y Y Y 
# of obs 1347 1347 1347 1347 1342 1342 
Notes: Sample analyzed include male veterans between age 26 and 64, who report year of separation between 
1990 and 1993. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Estimates are factored by 100. Veteran 
supplement weights are used. *, ** and *** indicate significant at ten, five and one percent level, respectively. 
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Table 1-8: Linear probability model. Dependent variable: service-connected disability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
A: OLS       
TAP 13.07*** 12.02*** 10.22*** 10.07*** 8.43** 8.15** 
 (3.53) (3.82) (3.72) (3.74) (3.76) (3.79) 
B: IV       
TAP 9.18** 6.93 4.23 4.01 1.04 0.83 
 (4.38) (4.85) (4.79) (4.82) (4.93) (4.92) 
Age    0.22 0.27 0.11 0.27 
   (1.51) (1.50) (1.53) (1.52) 
Age squared  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
   (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Black    3.18 2.66 3.11 
    (3.74) (3.80) (3.78) 
Other races   -3.63 -3.16 -3.28 
    (5.46) (5.39) (5.43) 
HS/GED    -6.35 -8.04 -7.87 
    (8.36) (8.48) (8.23) 
Born native   -1.87 -1.61 -1.96 
    (5.22) (5.17) (5.19) 
Deployed     6.05** 
      (2.52) 
Length of service      
6 months to 2 years    4.85 4.47 
     (4.67) (4.70) 
2 to 3 years    6.39 5.1 
     (4.46) (4.43) 
3 to 4 years    8.68** 6.71 
     (4.18) (4.21) 
5 to 9 years    10.31** 8.47* 
     (4.78) (4.81) 
10 to 14 years    10.27 8.5 
     (6.57) (6.42) 
15 to 19 years    24.92** 23.1** 
     (9.79) (9.68) 
20 years and over    25.43*** 23.45*** 
     (6.75) (6.72) 
Year of discharge      
1991  -1.12 -0.64 -0.50 0.35 -0.23 
  (3.34) (3.20) (3.20) (3.20) (3.18) 
1992  0.32 2.35 2.54 2.44 1.54 
  (3.57) (3.50) (3.50) (3.54) (3.55) 
1993  3.10 6.02 6.43* 5.98 5.12 
  (3.82) (3.77) (3.74) (3.79) (3.80) 
State & survey year FEs N Y Y Y Y Y 
# of obs 1340 1340 1340 1340 1335 1335 
Notes: Sample analyzed include male veterans between age 26 and 64, who report year of separation between 
1990 and 1993. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Estimates are factored by 100. Veteran 
supplement weights are used. *, ** and *** indicate significant at ten, five and one percent level, respectively. 
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Table 1-9: Correlation between state military population and outcomes of interest 
 Labor force participation Usually work full-time Some college and above 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Population 0.003 -0.002 0.009 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 
 (0.01) (0.009) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age  3.43***  4.39***  6.49*** 
  (0.27)  (0.21)  (0.29) 
Age squared -0.05***  -0.06***  -0.08*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
White  6.72***  3.59***  -1.92 
  (1.20)  (1.23)  (1.93) 
Black  5.73***  -0.04  -6.57*** 
  (1.60)  (1.92)  (2.01) 
Year dummy Y  Y  Y 
Lengths of service Y  Y  Y 
R squared 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.07 
# obs 19096 19096 19096 19096 19096 19096 
Note: Data source: American Community Survey 2003-2007. Sample include male veterans between age 18 and 
64, who report been on active duty in the past year. Population variable denotes state level military population 
in 2004, measured in 1,000. Length of service is a dummy indicating if the individual served for longer than 2 
years in active force. Standard errors are clustered by state of residence, and reported in parentheses. *, ** and 
*** indicate significant at ten, five and one percent level, respectively. 
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Table 1-10: Linear probability model: IV. Sample excludes veterans discharged in 1991. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Outcome LFP Full time College 
Sought 
training/education 
Service-connected 
disability 
TAP 8.56** 8.02* 15.59** 19.74*** 5.53 
 (3.47) (4.64) (6.16) (5.99) (5.38) 
Age  3.85** 5.09** 1.54 -0.19 -1.04 
 (1.70) (2.03) (2.27) (1.84) (1.88) 
Age squared -0.05** -0.07*** -0.01 -0.01 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Black -2.76 -2.31 1.36 -6.00 2.09 
 (3.92) (4.43) (5.73) (5.37) (4.52) 
Other races 3.94 -7.12 -9.32 -8.91 -0.79 
 (4.58) (8.42) (8.58) (7.34) (6.63) 
HS/GED 7.73 2.60  5.88 -17.57* 
 (12.42) (11.88)  (10.76) (10.62) 
Born native -2.58 -7.36 -9.04 -6.60 -0.80 
 (4.45) (6.60) (7.99) (7.75) (5.78) 
Deployed 0.85 2.65 6.32* 0.90 2.83 
 (2.03) (2.63) (3.57) (3.46) (3.06) 
Length of service     
6 months to 2 years 0.90 7.07 -8.38 -4.94 2.63 
 (5.21) (8.82) (11.60) (11.58) (5.80) 
2 to 3 years -2.06 6.98 1.20 1.87 3.96 
 (4.37) (7.33) (10.69) (11.07) (5.21) 
3 to 4 years 0.17 7.87 -6.46 -0.86 5.47 
 (4.40) (7.18) (10.25) (10.42) (4.86) 
5 to 9 years -4.55 -0.10 -1.95 1.11 8.86 
 (4.96) (7.62) (10.53) (10.61) (5.65) 
10 to 14 years -4.29 -0.89 6.56 -12.72 8.56 
 (7.18) (9.52) (11.49) (11.21) (7.63) 
15 to 19 years 3.76 15.70 -5.78 17.37 27.85** 
 (7.95) (9.82) (15.07) (15.38) (11.10) 
20 years and over 2.73 12.35 -2.64 -6.11 22.80*** 
 (6.65) (8.93) (11.67) (11.60) (8.14) 
State & survey year FEs Y Y Y Y Y 
Year of separation Y Y Y Y Y 
R squared 0.123 0.101 0.116 0.111 0.147 
# of obs 980 980 980 976 973 
Notes: Sample analyzed include male veterans between age 26 and 64, who report year of separation between 
1990, 1992, and 1993. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Estimates are factored by 100. 
Veteran supplement weights are used. *, ** and *** indicate significant at ten, five and one percent level, 
respectively. 
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Table 1-11: Labor market outcomes: by lengths of service 
 <=4 years > 4 years 
 (1) (2) 
 2SLS 2SLS 
A: Labor force participation 
TAP 3.64 9.05* 
 (4.39) (5.10) 
B: Usually work full time 
TAP 14.35** 1.28 
 (6.22) (6.37) 
    
# of obs 715 627 
Notes: Sample analyzed include male veterans between age 26 and 64, who report year of 
separation between 1990 and 1996. Full set of controls are included.  Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses, clustered by year of discharge. Estimates are factored by 100. Veteran 
supplement weights are used. *, ** and *** indicate significant at ten, five and one percent level, 
respectively. 
 
  
 
Table 1-12: Individual belief: find most helpful; Dependent variable: labor force participation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Share of 
participants 
ITT ITT ITT ITT ITT ITT 
TAP: offered  4.25** 2.69 3.34 3.74* 4.61** 2.38 
  (2.00) (2.17) (2.19) (2.04) (1.99) (2.22) 
Helpful: work related  45.6%  6.00***    5.23** 
   (2.21)    (2.42) 
Helpful: VA benefits 47.7%   3.22   1.91 
    (2.96)   (3.20) 
Helpful: Other 33.4%    2.67  0.85 
     (2.93)  (3.28) 
Not helpful 12.6%     -5.09 -2.69 
      (6.15) (6.29) 
# of obs 270 1342 1342 1342 1342 1342 1342 
Notes: Sample analyzed include male veterans between age 18 and 64, who report year of discharge between 1990 and 
1993. Full set of controls are included. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered by year of discharge. 
Helpful: other indicate that individual report TAP as being helpful in: prepare service and medical records; develop 
civilian mind-set; and unspecified reasons. Estimates are factored by 100. Veteran supplement weights are used. *, ** 
and *** indicate significant at ten, five and one percent level, respectively. 
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Chapter 2: Medicaid Eligibility, Insurance Coverage, and Birth Outcomes: Evidence from 
an Age Discontinuity in Eligibility Rule 
1. Introduction 
Since its inception in 1965, Medicaid serves as a part of the social safety net. The purpose 
of the program is to improve health conditions among low-income population by providing 
medical services at no cost. Literature find positive health effects for different target populations: 
newborn (Currie and Gruber 1996a), children (Currie and Gruber 1996b, Currie, Decker and Lin 
2008), and individuals with chronic diseases (Cuellar and Markowitz 2007).  
In addition to knowing the overall effectiveness, policymakers are equally interested in 
mechanisms through which Medicaid affect health outcomes. This question is not trivial because 
public provision of health insurance may lead to behavior responses on multiple dimensions. By 
lowering the cost of medical services, Medicaid may directly increase beneficiaries’ use of care. 
At the same time, Medicaid may have an indirect effect on health by freeing resources previously 
used to pay for medical care. This would increase consumption for other goods. Additionally, 
public provision of health insurance may provide a disincentive to take up private health 
insurance, which on average provides medical care of higher quality (Currie and Gruber 2001, 
Decker 2007).  
In this paper, I provide a more complete analysis of the behavior responses to Medicaid 
provision. The focus of this study is one of the most important target population of Medicaid: 
pregnant women. Particularly, I investigate the linkages between Medicaid availability, 
insurance coverage status, prenatal care utilization and health outcomes of newborns.  
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To establish causal relationships, I exploit variation in Medicaid eligibility across 
different demographic groups. Before early 1980s, pregnant women were entitled to Medicaid 
primarily through being beneficiaries of AFDC, which is a cash benefit program for families 
with dependent children. The eligibility scheme created discontinuity in Medicaid eligibility 
across different age groups: a first time pregnant woman may age out of Medicaid when she 
turns 18. Such discontinuity was eliminated by two federal expansions: the Deficit Reduction 
Act of 1984 (DRA84) and the Consolidated Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA85). 
The mandates untied Medicaid eligibility from AFDC, thus potentially increased Medicaid 
eligibility to first time pregnant women whose ages were above 18.  
Empirically, I employ a difference-in-differences method. The treatment group includes 
pregnant women immediately affected by the expansions (18 or 19 year olds). The control group 
includes pregnant women not immediately affected by the expansions (16 or 17 year olds). The 
causal effects of the policy changes are identified as changes in outcome differences between the 
treatment group and the control group. 
I use data come from two sources: the National Hospital Discharge Survey provides 
health insurance coverage status at delivery. The Birth Records from the National Vital Statistics 
System provide information regarding prenatal care use and the health outcomes of the baby. 
Both datasets contain demographic characteristics of the mother, which facilitate the 
implementation of the empirical strategy. 
I obtain three main findings. First, the policy changes affected the insurance coverage 
status of women at delivery. The treated group significantly increased Medicaid coverage by 6.5 
percentage points as the consequence of the policy changes. However, up to 60% of the new 
beneficiaries would have been covered by private insurance, absent of the Medicaid expansions. 
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Such crowd-out effect is more pronounced among the whites. For the blacks, the reduction in 
private insurance is small and insignificant.  
Second, for the whole sample, the treatment group did not exhibit an increase in use of 
medical services, which is measured by early access to prenatal care. The policy changes also 
seem to have little effect on the birth outcome of babies, which is measured by the prevalence of 
low birth weight. Such insignificant effects are found for both whites and blacks. 
Third, for the subsample of pregnant women who were giving birth for the first time – the 
subgroup most directly affected by the policy changes – the treatment effects on prenatal care 
use and prevalence of low birth weight varied across racial groups. For the whites, who most 
likely shifted from private insurance to Medicaid, the policy changes led to a small decrease in 
medical care use and worse health outcomes. For the blacks, who most likely shifted from no 
insurance to Medicaid, the policy changes led to a small increase in medical care use and better 
health outcomes.  
This study is closely related to two papers. The pioneer work by Currie and Gruber 
(1996a) looks directly at the impact of Medicaid expansion on birth outcomes. Utilizing state 
level variation in eligibility expansion, they find that early Medicaid expansions, which targets at 
more disadvantaged individuals, led to a substantial decrease in the incidence of low birth 
weight. Dave et.al (2010) used a similar approach as Currie and Gruber (1996a), and focus on 
insurance coverage of pregnant female at the time of delivery. Their findings suggest that the 
Medicaid expansions increased Medicaid coverage, but at the same time reduced private 
coverage by at least 55%. They argue that the substantial crowd-out may suggest limited health 
improvement effects for birth outcome or maternal health. However, they did not provide further 
evidence to document changes in care utilization or health outcomes. 
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This study adds to the literature in two ways. First, the variation I use comes from federal 
level policy changes that affected individuals in all states at the same time, which avoids the 
potential concern of state level policy endogeneity. Second, I jointly examine the effect of 
Medicaid availability on insurance coverage status, use of medical care and health outcomes of 
the targeted group. Such distinctions are important to understand the channels through which 
Medicaid provision affects health outcomes, and to understand the cost associated with Medicaid 
provision.  
2. Backgrounds 
2.1 Prenatal care and birth 
Receiving adequate and timely prenatal care is vital to the well-being of pregnant female 
and the health of the newborns. Typically, the recommended prenatal care lasts over the course 
of pregnancy, and consists of doctor visits on a regular basis. During these prenatal care visits, 
physicians do regular checkup to screen for potential birth defects, monitor fetus growth 
condition, and provide information and advice for dos and don’ts for daily lifestyle. Medical 
studies suggest that prenatal care is effective in improving the health condition of the newborns: 
babies of mothers who do not receive prenatal care are three times more likely to be of low birth 
weight.31  
 Prenatal care is associated with substantial costs. According to the Kaiser Family 
Foundation, the average total cost for typical prenatal care over the pregnancy period is around 
$2,000.32 The cost is often covered by mother’s health insurance.33 However, if one was 
                                                          
31 http://www.womenshealth.gov/publications/our-publications/fact-sheet/prenatal-care.html#a 
32 http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/7636.pdf 
33 One thing worth noting is that maternity related medical service are mandated by Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
of 1978 to be covered by group insurance for employees and spouses. However, such mandates do apply to 
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uninsured at the time of pregnancy, obtaining prenatal care can be a financial burden. Obtaining 
private individual health insurance plan after pregnancy would be potentially difficult, as 
pregnancy can be legally treated as preexisting condition. This means that insurance companies 
can refuse to reimburse cost associated with prenatal visits. For the disadvantaged population 
who are likely uninsured, obtaining timely prenatal care can be a financial burden to individuals 
from disadvantaged backgrounds. 
2.2 Legislative history: Medicaid expansions 
To address the concern that female of disadvantaged backgrounds lack necessary care, 
the federal and state governments expanded the scope of public assistance. In particular, the 
assistance is provided to low-income pregnant female through Medicaid. Medicaid provides 
beneficiaries with comprehensive medical services including prenatal care services, medical 
services delivered during delivery and the necessary care after delivery. Importantly, these 
services are provided to beneficiaries at no cost.  
At its inception in 1965, Medicaid was designed as an add-on program to other social 
welfare programs. In the context of maternity relevant population, most individuals were 
qualified for Medicaid through being recipients of AFDC, which provides cash benefits to low-
income families with dependent children. Two sets of eligibility rules apply for AFDC: the 
categorical eligibility and income/resource eligibility. To meet the categorical eligibility 
requirement, one must be in a family with one or more dependent children, of age under 18.34 To 
                                                          
dependent coverage. If one is covered by her parents’ insurance, she will potentially be denied coverage for prenatal 
care and delivery. Although official data not available, Mercer's performance audit group estimates that 70% of 
group insurance excludes such coverage. 
34 AFDC traditionally targets at single parent households. The AFDC-UP program also covers two parents’ 
households (married or unmarried) with the head of the household unemployed. The income eligibility threshold 
varies for this type of eligibility. For the purpose of this study, I do not distinguish single headed households and 
two-parent households. 
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meet the income eligibility requirement, the household income must be below a certain 
threshold. Such thresholds are set at state level to adjust for varied costs of living.  
The eligibility rules made it difficult for some low-income pregnant women to gain 
timely access to necessary medical care. In particular, a first time pregnant female may be 
deemed disqualified for AFDC, if there is no qualified child present in the household. Back in 
the early 1980s, 21 states did not provide AFDC, thus Medicaid, to first time pregnant women; 
28 states started to provide Medicaid to first time pregnant women starting from the sixth months 
of pregnancy.35 
Concerned about the low insurance coverage rate among pregnant women and high infant 
mortality rate, state and federal governments took initiative to expand the scope of coverage 
starting from early 1980s. Broadly speaking, the expansions toward pregnant women occurred in 
two phases. In the first phase, Medicaid eligibility for pregnant women was gradually untied 
from AFDC. This was done primarily through two federal mandates: the Deficit Reduction Act 
of 1984 (DRA84) and Consolidated Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA85). The DRA 
84 mandated coverage for first-time pregnant women and pregnant women in AFDC-UP type 
families. The law was effective in October 1984, but states had until the regular session of the 
State legislature in 1985 (January for most of the states) to comply. The COBRA85 mandated 
coverage for all pregnant women who met the AFDC income/resource standard, regardless of 
family structure. The law was effective in July 1986. The two federal mandates significantly 
reduced the constraints caused of the categorical eligibility requirements: low-income pregnant 
                                                          
35 Source: Hill (1984). Arizona did not provide Medicaid coverage at the time.  
67 
 
female were eligible for Medicaid coverage immediately after medical diagnose, regardless of 
family structure. 
In the second phase of the expansions, both the federal and state legislations gradually 
increased the income eligibility threshold. These expansions extended coverage to individuals 
with higher income level. These policies included: the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1986, 
which increased the income eligibility threshold to 100 percent of poverty; the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1987, which allowed states to increase the income eligibility threshold to 
as high as 185 percent of poverty; and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, which 
mandates the income eligibility threshold to be set equal to or above 133 percent of poverty.   
3. Methodology 
 The purpose of this study is to measure the effects of Medicaid provision on low-income 
women’s insurance coverage status, their access to prenatal care and the birth outcomes of 
newborns. Ideally, such effects could be measured by the association between individual level 
Medicaid availability and the outcomes of interest.   
However, individual level Medicaid eligibility is affected by factors that are directly 
associated with the outcomes of interest, leading to difficulties establishing causal relationships. 
For example, Medicaid is provided to individuals with limited income and resources. The target 
group would have less access to medical services and worse health conditions compared to 
individuals who are not the target of Medicaid. Additionally, Medicaid availability is affected by 
macroeconomic conditions. A higher unemployment rate is potentially associated more people 
eligible for Medicaid. At the same time, a sluggish economy may also directly affect prenatal 
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care utilization and birth outcomes.36 Finally, Medicaid availability varies across states. State 
characteristics may also vary on other dimensions such as number of hospital beds per capita and 
the generosity of other social insurance programs (e.g. AFDC). Such differences may directly 
affect the health conditions.  
To circumvent these difficulties, I exploit exogenous variation in Medicaid availability 
generated by policy changes. In particular, I rely on the two federal mandates that focus on 
relaxing the categorical eligibility rules: DRA84 and COBRA85. As discussed in the background 
section, these federal mandates untied Medicaid eligibility from the family structure constraint 
embedded in AFDC eligibility, thus generated different effects on Medicaid eligibility of low-
income women from different demographic groups. 
To be more specific, suppose there are two pregnant women, one at the age of 17 and the 
other 19, of similar family background and income level. Prior to the expansions, the latter is less 
likely eligible for Medicaid, as she ages out of being a qualified dependent child for the AFDC 
program. After the expansions, both women are equally likely qualified for Medicaid. Thus, the 
expansions potentially led to an immediate increase in Medicaid eligibility for women above 18 
years of age, while had no immediate impact on women with ages just below 18. 
Empirically, I follow a difference-in-differences method. The treatment group includes 
women who were directly affected by the policy changes: those of age 18 or 19. The control 
group includes women who were slightly younger than the treatment group, and were not 
immediately affected by the policy changes: those of age 16 or 17. The causal effects of the 
                                                          
36 For the association between health conditions and macro-economic conditions, see Ruhm (2000), Arkes (2007), 
Ruhm (2013), and Currie et al. (2013). 
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policy changes are identified as the differences in outcomes between the two groups, before and 
after the policy changes.  
 Based on the legislative history, I restrict the analysis to births occurred in years 1982 to 
1986. This reflect a period when the Medicaid expansions focused primarily on the categorical 
eligibility rules. Specifically, the pre-policy period includes years 1982 to 1984. I use January 
1985 as the first month of post-policy period, as this coincide with the state legislature convene 
timing of calendar year 1985 for most of the states. I end the post-policy period by December 
1986 for two reasons. First, starting in April 1987, a subsequent policy change - the Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 (OBRA86) – was effective. The OBRA86 permitted states to 
increase income threshold for pregnant women to up to 100% of the poverty line. Variation 
occurred across states in adopting the expansion. On the other hand, the timing and generosity of 
state level expansions are potentially correlated with other state level unobserved attributes. To 
avoid state level legislative endogeneity concern, I exclude from the analysis sample births 
occurred after OBRA86 became effective. Second, I further exclude birth occurred in the first 
three month of 1987, to ensure that both pre-policy and post-policy sample are evenly distributed 
over the months of the year. Buckles and Hungerman (2013) documents substantial seasonality 
pattern of maternal characteristics.  
The regression framework is as follows: 
(1)  Y𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝛼2 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼3 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼4 ∗ 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Y𝑖𝑡 denotes the outcomes of interest. 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 is a dummy variable indicating whether the 
observation is in the treatment group. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 is a dummy variable indicating whether the time of 
birth is in the post-policy period. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 denotes a vector of individual observed characteristics. The 
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error term is denoted as 𝜀𝑖𝑡. The coefficient of interest is 𝛼2, which measure the relative change 
in outcomes for the treatment group, as the consequence of the policy changes. The estimated 
causal effects are interpreted as intent-to-treat effects. 
The difference-in-differences strategy addresses the identification issues noted earlier. 
First, the effects of Medicaid provision is identified by the exogenous shocks to the eligibility 
rules. These shocks led to an increase in Medicaid provision that was not directly associated with 
latent individual characteristics such as income level. Second, the inclusion of the control group 
purges time-specific attributes that may potentially affect the treatment and comparison group in 
similar manner, such as macroeconomic conditions. Finally, the policies that I focus on are 
federal level mandates that affect individuals from all states at the same time. The effects of state 
level unobserved attributes are differenced out by comparing outcomes before and after the 
policy changes. 
The identification assumptions are: the outcomes of the treatment group and the 
comparison group would trend similarly had there been no policy changes. Additionally, there is 
no other factors that occurred at the same time as the Medicaid expansions, and would affect the 
treatment group and comparison group differently. Evidence to support these assumptions is 
provided in the following sections: the outcomes trended similarly for the treatment and 
comparison groups prior to the Medicaid expansion; the estimated treatment effects are largely 
robust to controlling for worrisome confounders.  
4. Data and Sample 
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 The main data come from two sources. For prenatal care use and birth outcomes, I draw 
information from Birth Records from the National Vital Statistics System. For health insurance 
coverage status, I draw information from National Hospital Discharge Survey.  
4.1 Birth Records from the National Vital Statistics System 
 The National Vital Statistics System compiles official birth record information 
maintained by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The information comes from 
individual level birth certificates, which is required to be completed for all birth by State laws. It 
covers every birth occurred within the US territory. 
 I draw two sets of information from the individual level birth records. First, I use 
information on the demographic characteristics of the mother and the baby. These demographic 
characteristics include age, race, maternity history and marital status of the mother. I also draw 
information regarding the gender of the baby and whether the delivery is a single birth. Second, I 
focus on indicators for prenatal care access and birth outcomes of the baby. Prenatal care access 
is measured by a dummy variable indicating whether the mother started regular prenatal care by 
the end of second trimester. This indicator is a reflection of whether prenatal care is initiated in a 
timely manner. For birth outcome, I follow previous literature and focus on the prevalence of 
low birth weight (birth weight less than 2,500g). 
 4.2 National Hospital Discharge Survey 
 The National Hospital Discharge Survey (NHDS) is an annual survey conducted by the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The survey provides information for a 
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representative sample of inpatients discharged from non-Federal short-stay hospitals.37 The 
observation is at individual patient level. The survey covers information regarding basic 
demographic characteristics, expected methods of payment, date of discharge, length of stay, 
diagnosis and procedures performed during the stay. The information is collected by hospital 
personnel or Bureau of Census staff to ensure accuracy.  
 For the purpose of this study, I restrict the analysis sample to women whose hospital stay 
is maternity related. To do so, I reply on the primary diagnosis code (ICD-9-CM): an observation 
is identified as a pregnant woman if the primary diagnosis code is classified as “outcomes of 
delivery”. One concern with the sample restriction is that it does not include female giving birth 
in a non-hospital setting, or those giving birth in federal hospitals. Such concern is likely minor, 
as the share of birth in non-hospital setting (<5% annually38) and share of federal hospitals 
(3.69%39) are both small.  
 Two sets of information facilitate the analysis. First, I use patient demographic 
characteristics including age, marital status and race. Second, I use insurance coverage status. I 
infer the information based on “Principal expected source of payment”. The patient is coded as 
having Medicaid coverage, if Medicaid is reported as the expected source of payment. The 
patient is coded as having private coverage, if the expected source of payment is “Blue Cross, 
Blue Shield”, or “Other private insurance”. The patient is coded as having no coverage, if the 
expected payment source is “self-pay”. 
4.3 Sample 
                                                          
37 Surveyed hospitals include those with an average length of stay of fewer than 30 days, exclusive of federal, 
military, the Department of Veterans Affairs hospitals and hospitals with fewer than six beds. 
38 Vital statistics, Birth Records. 
39 American Hospital Association. http://www.aha.org/research/rc/stat-studies/fast-facts.shtml 
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To implement the difference-in-differences method, I restrict the analysis sample to 
pregnant women between ages 16 and 19 at the time of delivery, and the delivery occurred 
between 1982 and 1986. Additionally, I restrict the sample to births given in a hospital setting 
because only this group is recorded in the National Hospital Discharge Survey. This restriction 
excludes approximately 5% of all births in the Birth Records.  
One potential concern is that the sample is conditional on live births. If the Medicaid 
availability affects the decision to have children or affects the prevalence of fetal death, the 
estimated treatment effects would be biased. To address the concern, I draw information on 
aggregate birth rates and fetal death rates by mother’s ages. The trends of both rates are similar 
for the treatment group and comparison group both before and after Medicaid expansions. This 
suggests that the expansions did not seem to significantly affected the decision to have children 
or the prevalence of fetal death.  
Table 1 displays a summary of characteristics. Column 1 and 4 focus on the whole 
analysis sample. Some demographic characteristics are reported in both data sets, including age, 
marital status and race. Comparing the two datasets, NHDS and Birth Records, the whole sample 
displays similar characteristics.40  
I separately show the summary statistics of the treatment and control groups in Table 1, 
columns 2-3 and 5-6. As documented in both datasets, the older cohort – women of ages 18 or 19 
– are more likely to be married and be white. Panel B and C provide summary statistics of 
outcome variables. NHDS provides information regarding insurance coverage, which is shown in 
panel B, Table 1.The treatment and control groups have overall similar Medicaid coverage rates. 
                                                          
40 One thing worth noting is that the Birth Records seem to report a higher share of whites. One possible reason for 
the mismatch is the two datasets code the race variable slightly differently. 
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The older cohort, those of 18 or 19 years old, are more likely covered by private insurance, and 
less likely paying out of pocket. The Birth Records provides information regarding prenatal care 
utilization and health outcomes of newborns. Summary statistics of the two key variables are 
shown in panel C, Table 1.  On average, about 9.2% of all birth in the analysis sample have low 
birth weight. This condition have higher prevalence among 16 or 17 year olds. About 88.3% of 
all mothers had early access to prenatal care. The younger cohort, women of ages 16 or 17, had 
greater difficulty gaining early access to prenatal care. 
5. Results 
 This section reports how the policy changes affected the three outcomes of interest: 
insurance coverage, use of prenatal care and birth outcomes. For each outcome, I first 
graphically show the outcome trends for the treatment group and comparison group, respectively. 
The graphical illustration examines whether two groups have similar outcome trends prior to the 
policy changes, and shows how the outcomes of the two groups are affected differently by the 
policy changes. I then perform regression analysis to quantify the potential effects of the policy 
changes.  
5.1 Health insurance coverage 
 I first examine if the eligibility expansions led to an increase in Medicaid coverage. This 
is shown graphically in Figure 1. Panel A plots the share of women covered by Medicaid in the 
treatment group (18 or 19 year olds) and the comparison group (16 or 17 year olds) against the 
sample year. Prior to the expansions, the Medicaid coverage rates trended similarly for the two 
groups. The control group had a higher coverage rate than the treatment group. Additionally, the 
policy interventions significantly increased the coverage rate for the treatment group. In the post-
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policy period, the treatment group appeared to have a higher Medicaid coverage rate than the 
comparison group. Panel B plots the Medicaid coverage rates of pre-policy period (1982-1984) 
and post-policy period (1985-1986) against the patients’ ages. The trends confirm that the 
treatment group experienced a significant gain in Medicaid coverage after the policy changes. 
The comparison group did not present significantly different Medicaid coverage rates before and 
after the policy changes. 
 To quantify the relative gain in Medicaid coverage for the treatment group, I perform 
regression analysis. I use a series of specifications following equation (1), with varied sets of 
controls. The results are shown in Table 2a, Panel A. Column 1 reports results of the 
specification that includes no additional control variables. The coefficient of interest, that of the 
policy*post interaction term, suggests that the treated group experienced a relative increase of 
5.5 percentage points in Medicaid coverage as the consequence of the expansions. To check the 
robustness of the estimated treatment effect, I further add demographic characteristics, month-of-
discharge dummies and region fixed effects. The coefficients are reported in Column 2 and 
column 3. The magnitude and statistical power of the point estimates of the interaction term are 
robust. The preferred specification in column 3 suggests that the expansions led to a 6.5 
percentage point relative increase in Medicaid coverage of the treatment groups.    
 The literature has long documented the “crowd-out” effect of public health insurance 
provision.41 The crowd-out describes the phenomenon that public provision of health insurance 
may provide an incentive for eligible population to opt out from private insurance coverage. To 
examine the crowd-out effect of the Medicaid expansions, I turn to private insurance coverage as 
                                                          
41 Studies examining crowd-out effect focus on various Medicaid expansions for different periods and target groups. 
See, for example, Cutler and Gruber (1996), Aizer and Grogger (2003), Ham and Shore-Sheppard (2005), Shore-
Sheppard (2008), Hamersma and Kim (2012).  
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an outcome. I follow the same specifications. The results are reported in Table 2a, columns 4-6. 
As shown in the preferred specification in column 6, Table 2a, the eligibility expansions led to a 
3.9 percentage point relative decrease in private insurance coverage of the treatment group. The 
point estimate suggests a crowd-out rate of about 0.6: 60% of the new Medicaid beneficiaries 
would have been covered by private insurance, had there been no expansions. However, the 
negative effect on the private insurance coverage is not statistically significant at five percent 
level.42 The point estimate for the crowd-out rate may also lack statistical power.  
 I further investigate how the effects on insurance coverage differ across women of varied 
social economic status. Literature suggests that the effect of public programs may have different 
effects on people of different social economics status. In particular, the crowd-out effect would 
be less severe for women from more disadvantaged backgrounds, who would face greater 
difficulty gaining private insurance absent of Medicaid.43 To examine if this is the case, I 
perform subgroup analysis using mother’s race as an indicator for social economic backgrounds. 
Table 2b and Table 2c show the effects of the expansions on Medicaid coverage and private 
insurance coverage for the whites and blacks, respectively. Results suggest that the expansions 
led to both a significant increase in Medicaid coverage (6.9 percentage points) and a significant 
decrease in private insurance coverage (4.3 percentage points) for the whites. However, for the 
black women, who are less likely to have access to other forms of insurance coverage, the 
expansion led to an increase in Medicaid coverage (4.3 percentage points), with minimal 
decrease in private coverage (0.8 percentage points). 
                                                          
42 The 95 percent confidence interval is [-0.092, 0.014]. 
43 See, for example, Dubay and Kenney (1997) and Currie and Gruber (2001), 
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 To sum up, findings suggest that the expansions increased Medicaid coverage at the 
expense of a significant reduction of private insurance. The shift of insurance coverage status 
differ across racial groups. For the white population, the crowd-out effect was large and 
significant. For the black population, the expansions did not lead to a significant reduction in 
private insurance coverage. 
5.2 Access to prenatal care 
 This section examines whether the increase in Medicaid coverage led to an increase in the 
use to prenatal care. Particularly, I focus on whether one have early access to prenatal care, as 
measured by starting prenatal care as early as in the second trimester.  
The outcome trends for the treatment and comparison groups are shown in Figure 2. On 
average, the treatment group had better access to prenatal care. This pattern did not seem to 
change after the policy intervention. I further split the sample by racial group. For both the 
blacks and the whites, the treatment groups had better access to prenatal care than the 
comparison groups. Such pattern also did not seem to diverge after the policy changes.  
I turn to regression analysis to quantify any potential effects. I follow the same 
difference-in-differences specification as in the previous sections. The results for the whole 
sample are displayed in Table 3a. Column 1 reports the coefficients from the specification with 
no additional controls. The coefficient of interest, the one of the interaction term, suggests that 
the expansions led to a 0.49 percentage point decrease in access to early prenatal care for the 
treatment group. Such effect is robust to the inclusion of demographic controls, state fixed 
effects and months of birth fixed effects, as shown in columns 2 and 3.  
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Column 4 adds controls for legal drinking regulations, which correlates with age and may 
have direct effect on outcomes of interest. The National Minimum Drinking Age Act of 1984 
imposed penalty to states that allowed persons below 21 years to purchase alcoholic beverages 
by reducing federal highway apportionment. In compliance to the federal regulation, states 
gradually raised their minimum drinking age (which was as low as 18 in some states) in 
throughout the 1980s. This notable regulatory change happened at about the same time as the 
Medicaid expansions. Legal drinking may also directly affect one’s health condition and birth 
outcomes. I thus include controls for whether the observed individual can legally purchase 
alcohol, based on age and the state of residence. The result in column 4 suggests that the 
coefficient of interest is robust.  
I further split the sample by race and report the results in Table 3b and Table 3c. For the 
whites, who experienced greater crowd-out effects, the treatment group had a relative decline of 
0.55 percentage points in receiving prenatal care early, out of a baseline of 0.901. For the blacks, 
who experienced little crowd-out effects, the expansions did not have any effect on receiving 
early prenatal care.  
 5.3 Health outcome: low birth weight 
This section focuses on the effect of Medicaid provision on birth outcome. Following the 
literature, I focus on the prevalence of low birth weight.44 Figure 3 graphically shows the trends 
of the prevalence of low birth weight for the treatment and comparison groups. Women in the 
treatment group are on average less likely to give birth to under-weight babies. For the whole 
                                                          
44 In addition to low birth weight, I examine alternative measure for birth outcomes. I examine the effects of 
Medicaid eligibility on the prevalence of premature births. The estimated treatment effects are very similar to the 
effects on the prevalence of low birth weight. I also experiment with different cut-offs to denote low birth weight 
and find similar patterns.  
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sample (panel A) and the whites (panel B), the difference in low birth weight between treatment 
and comparison groups seem persistent both before and after the policy change. For the blacks 
(panel C), the trends are more noisy, plausibly due to the smaller sample size. The treatment 
group seem to have a relative drop in low birth weight prevalence after the policy change, 
relative to the treatment group.    
 I turn to regression analysis to quantify the effects. Again, I follow the difference-in-
differences approach as in the previous sections. The results for the whole sample are shown in 
Table 4a. Column 1 reports the coefficients for the specification with no additional controls. The 
coefficient of interest, the one of the interaction term, suggests that the Medicaid eligibility 
expansions led to a 0.2 percentage point increase in the prevalence low birth weight, which is 
statistically significant at five percent level. Column 2 and 3 further include demographic 
characteristics of the mother (race, marital status), characteristics of the baby (gender, whether 
single birth), state fixed effects, and month of birth dummies. The coefficient of interest is small 
and insignificant. Column 4 further controls for whether the observation have legal access to 
alcohol, based on the age and the state of residence. The coefficient of interest remains small and 
insignificant. 
 I further split the sample by race. The results for the two racial groups, whites and blacks, 
are shown in Table 4b and Table 4c, respectively. For the whites, the preferred specification in 
column 4 shows that, the Medicaid expansions led to an 0.16 percentage points increase in the 
incidence of low birth weight. This point estimate reflects a 2% increase. However, given the 
enormous sample size, the point estimate is only significant at ten percent level. For the blacks, 
the point estimate suggest that Medicaid eligibility expansion led to a 0.2 percentage points 
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(1.5%) decrease in the incident of low birth weight. Again, the point estimate is statistically 
insignificant.  
 Overall, the results from the whole sample reveal no significant effects of the policy 
changes on use of medical care and birth outcomes. One concern with the whole sample analysis 
is that the marginal affected population – the low-income women shifting insurance coverage 
due to the policy changes – is potentially of a small share of the whole population. In the next 
section, I attempt to address the concern by restricting the analysis sample to individuals more 
likely affected by the policy changes. 
6. Extensions 
 In this section, I perform subgroup analysis for two groups of women who are most likely 
directly affected by the policy changes, based on their states of residence and family structure.  
6.1 States with more substantial expansions 
  As discussed in the background section, pregnancy condition alone did not lead to 
entitlement of Medicaid prior to the federal mandates. However, states took slightly different 
approaches in treating the fetus, which generated variation in Medicaid entitlement. Specifically, 
21 states did not treat the fetus as a dependent child until birth; 28 states treated the fetus as a 
dependent child starting from the third trimester. For the former states, pregnant women without 
dependent child cannot have access to Medicaid throughout the course of pregnancy. This group 
thus tends to have benefited more from the eligibility expansions. 
 I repeat the analysis in the main analysis to the subsample of women who resided in the 
21 states that had more substantial expansions. Table 5 displays the results, following the 
preferred specification with the full set of control variables. For both outcome variables of 
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interest – medical care use and prevalence of low birth weight – the subsample analysis reveal 
similar pattern as in the main analysis: for the whites who experienced substantial crowd-out, 
expansions led to a small decrease in early access to prenatal care, but no significant change in 
prevalence of low birth weight babies. For the blacks who experienced minimum crowd-out, the 
expansions did not lead to significant change in both use of care and birth outcomes.  
6.2 First-time pregnant women  
 In this section, I restrict the sample to women who were giving birth for the first time. 
Among the 2.15 million births given by women aged 16 to 19 during the five years, 1.48 million 
were first time birth.  
 I repeat the regression analysis for the first-time pregnant women. The results are shown 
in Table 6. For the whole sample, shown in columns 1 and 4, the policy expansions did not lead 
to significant effects on access to prenatal care or the prevalence of low birth weight. I further 
split the sample by race. The results are reported in columns 2, 3, 5 and 6. The policy changes 
had different effects on the whites and blacks. The white women experienced a significant 
decrease in early access to prenatal care by 0.43 percentage points, which reflects a 5.2% 
increase in the probability of not receiving timely prenatal care. The prevalence of low birth 
weight babies increased by 0.22 percentage points, which reflects a 3.3% increase. On the 
contrary, the black women had an increase in early access to prenatal care by 0.38 percentage 
points. This reflects a 3.58% increase. The prevalence of low birth weight among newborns 
reduced by 0.31 percentage points, reflecting a 2.60% reduction. The results for the blacks are 
only significant at ten percent level. 
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 The divergent pattern of the treatment effects among the whites and the blacks is 
consistent with the findings regarding the crowd-out effect. For the whites, who most likely 
shifted from private insurance to Medicaid, the policy changes led to a decrease in medical care 
use and worse health outcomes. For the blacks, who most likely shifted from no insurance to 
Medicaid, the policy changes led to an increase in medical care use and better health outcomes. 
6. Discussion and Future Work 
This study investigates the effects of Medicaid provision to pregnant women on their 
insurance coverage status, use of medical care and birth outcomes. I exploit variation in 
Medicaid eligibility across different demographic groups and over time. Before early 1980s, the 
eligibility of Medicaid was tied to AFDC, which provided cash benefits to families with 
dependent children. This created discontinuity in Medicaid eligibility across different age 
groups: a first time pregnant woman may age out of Medicaid when she turns 18. Such 
discontinuity was eliminated by the two federal expansions in mid-1980s. As a result, female of 
age 18 or 19 would potentially have a significant increase in eligibility in Medicaid.  
I employ a difference-in-differences method. Using data from the National Hospital 
Discharge Survey, I find that the policy changes increased Medicaid coverage for the treated 
group by a significant 6.5 percentage point. However, the expansions also led to a decrease in 
private insurance coverage, especially among the whites. With regard to the use of medical 
service and birth outcomes, I use data from the Birth Records from the National Vital Statistics 
System. Findings reveal no evidence that the treatment group increased use of prenatal care. 
There is also no significant evidence that the birth outcomes of newborns, measured by the 
incidence of low birth weight, are affected by Medicaid provision.  
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Findings in this study leave open important questions regarding channels through which 
the public provision of health insurance affects one’s well-being. My findings suggest that the 
significant increase in Medicaid coverage did not translate into increase in use of medical 
service. However, increase in Medicaid coverage may have other implications. For example, new 
Medicaid beneficiaries may have a gain in disposable income, which was previously used to pay 
for private or group insurance premium or co-payment. The extra resources may be used for 
consumptions that may or may not be health improving. Thus, one natural avenue for future 
research is to examine the effect of Medicaid availability on consumption pattern. Additionally, 
Medicaid beneficiaries are often automatically enrolled in other social insurance programs. One 
important program for maternity health is the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for 
Women, Infants and Children (WIC). The WIC is a federal assistance program that provides 
supplemental food, formula, nutrition education and access to healthcare and other social 
services. The potential interactions between WIC and Medicaid leave room for future research. 
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Figure 2-1: Trends in Medicaid Coverage 
 
 
Notes: Data come from National Hospital Discharge Survey. Sample include patients whose the primary 
diagnosis code (ICD-9-CM) is classified as “outcomes of delivery”. Survey weights are used.  
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Figure 2-2: Outcome trends: started prenatal care as early as the second trimester 
 
A: whole sample 
  
B: Whites 
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C: Blacks 
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Figure 2-3: Outcome trends: low birth weight 
 
A: whole sample 
 
B: Whites 
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C: Blacks 
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Table 2-1: Summary of characteristics    
 National Hospital Discharge Survey Birth Records 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Whole sample 16 or 17  18 or 19 Whole sample 16 or 17  18 or 19 
A: Demographics      
Age 17.93 16.64 18.56 17.94 16.62 18.57 
 (1.02) (0.48) (0.50) (1.03) (0.48) (0.50) 
Married 0.43 0.31 0.48 0.45 0.33 0.52 
 (0.49) (0.46) (0.50) (0.50) (0.47) (0.50) 
White 0.67 0.63 0.69 0.71 0.66 0.73 
 (0.47) (0.48) (0.46) (0.45) (0.47) (0.44) 
Black 0.28 0.32 0.26 0.27 0.32 0.25 
 (0.45) (0.47) (0.44) (0.44) (0.47) (0.42) 
B: Insurance Coverage      
Medicaid 0.36 0.37 0.36    
 (0.48) (0.48) (0.48)    
Private 0.3 0.28 0.32    
 (0.46) (0.45) (0.46)    
Self-pay 0.21 0.23 0.21    
 (0.41) (0.42) (0.40)    
C: Outcomes      
Low birth weight   0.092 0.102 0.088 
    (0.29) (0.30) (0.28) 
Early prenatal care   0.883 0.868 0.890 
    (0.29) (0.34) (0.31) 
# of obs.  10398 3412 6986 2107611 676608 1431003 
Notes: Data come from the National Hospital Discharge Survey and the Birth Records from National 
Vital Statistics System. Sample includes births given by mothers of age 16-19, in years 1982 to 1986. 
For the Birth Record Data, only births given in a hospital setting are included in the sample. Survey 
weights are used for the National Hospital Discharge Survey. Standard deviations are reported in 
parenthesis.  
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Table 2-2a: Difference-in-differences: Insurance Coverage, whole sample  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 A: Medicaid coverage B: Private insurance coverage 
Treatment -0.031* 0.021 0.019 0.050 0.022 0.020 
 (0.007) (0.019) (0.018) (0.021) (0.016) (0.015) 
Post -0.010 -0.045** -0.042** -0.048* -0.033 -0.027 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.017) (0.016) 
Interaction 0.055* 0.066* 0.065* -0.036 -0.037 -0.039 
 (0.010) (0.016) (0.014) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) 
White  -0.055 -0.040  0.162** 0.162** 
  (0.024) (0.020)  (0.018) (0.017) 
Black  0.072* 0.103**  0.090* 0.068 
  (0.022) (0.015)  (0.027) (0.028) 
Married  -0.276** -0.264**  0.157 0.150 
  (0.041) (0.043)  (0.092) (0.092) 
Discharge month  Y   Y 
Region   Y   Y 
Observations 11,758 9,329 9,329 11,758 9,329 9,329 
R-squared 0.002 0.120 0.129 0.008 0.053 0.065 
Notes: Data come from National Hospital Discharge Survey. Sample include patients whose the 
primary diagnosis code (ICD-9-CM) is classified as “outcomes of delivery”. Survey weights are used. 
Standard errors are clustered by age, reported in parenthesis. * and ** denote 5% and 1% significant 
level, respectively.  
 
Table 2-2b: Difference-in-differences: Insurance Coverage; whites only  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Medicaid coverage Private insurance coverage 
Treatment -0.041** 0.002 -0.001 0.063 0.045 0.040 
 (0.006) (0.022) (0.021) (0.025) (0.018) (0.017) 
Post 0.002 -0.033 -0.036 -0.058* -0.040 -0.033 
 (0.022) (0.018) (0.014) (0.015) (0.023) (0.019) 
Interaction 0.065 0.065 0.069* -0.039 -0.042 -0.043 
 (0.024) (0.022) (0.021) (0.025) (0.028) (0.025) 
Married  -0.253* -0.238*  0.136 0.124 
  (0.045) (0.048)  (0.093) (0.094) 
Discharge month  Y   Y 
Region   Y   Y 
Observations 6,696 5,961 5,961 6,696 5,961 5,961 
R-squared 0.004 0.078 0.089 0.010 0.029 0.048 
Notes: Data come from National Hospital Discharge Survey. Sample include patients whose the 
primary diagnosis code (ICD-9-CM) is classified as “outcomes of delivery”. Survey weights are used. 
Standard errors are clustered by age, reported in parenthesis. * and ** denote 5% and 1% significant 
level, respectively.  
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Table 2-2c: Difference-in-differences: Insurance Coverage; blacks only.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Medicaid coverage Private insurance coverage 
Treatment 0.045 0.084 0.086 -0.010 -0.036 -0.035 
 (0.023) (0.030) (0.033) (0.003) (0.021) (0.024) 
Post -0.044 -0.049** -0.042** -0.039* -0.025* -0.021 
 (0.021) (0.001) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) 
Interaction 0.049 0.050 0.043 -0.004 -0.003 -0.008 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.010) (0.013) (0.021) 
Married  -0.407** -0.401**  0.294* 0.295* 
  (0.032) (0.027)  (0.070) (0.069) 
Discharge month  Y   Y 
Region   Y   Y 
Observations 3,208 2,859 2,859 3,208 2,859 2,859 
R-squared 0.005 0.063 0.075 0.003 0.048 0.056 
Notes: Data come from National Hospital Discharge Survey. Sample include patients whose the 
primary diagnosis code (ICD-9-CM) is classified as “outcomes of delivery”. Survey weights are used. 
Standard errors are clustered by age, reported in parenthesis. * and ** denote 5% and 1% significant 
level, respectively.  
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Table 2-3a: Difference-in-differences: early prenatal care; whole sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treatment 2.39** 1.24** 1.03** 0.752** 
 (0.127) (0.196) (0.0834) (0.114) 
Post -0.247 0.051 -0.0204 -0.0293 
 (0.252) (0.26) (0.235) (0.238) 
Interaction -0.491** -0.408** -0.425** -0.305** 
 (0.115) (0.109) (0.106) (0.102) 
Black  2.50 2.94** 2.94** 
  (1.59) (0.817) (0.815) 
White  3.04 3.40** 3.40** 
  (1.51) (0.528) (0.527) 
Married  5.76** 6.36** 6.34** 
  (0.612) (0.415) (0.410) 
Male child  0.135** 0.128** 0.128** 
  (0.03) (0.0442) (0.0441) 
Single birth  -1.56** -1.53** -1.53** 
  (0.198) (0.187) (0.187) 
State fixed effects   Y Y 
Month of birth   Y Y 
Legal drinking    Y 
Observations 2,107,611 2,095,566 2,095,566 2,095,566 
R-squared 0.001 0.010 0.029 0.029 
Notes: Data come from the Birth Records from National Vital Statistics System. Sample include births 
given by mothers of age 16-19, in years 1982 to 1986. Reported coefficients are factored by 100.  
Standard errors are clustered by state, reported in parenthesis. * and ** denote 5% and 1% significant 
level, respectively.   
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Table 2-3b: Difference-in-differences: early prenatal care; whites 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treatment 2.60** 1.49** 1.14** 0.878** 
 (0.169) (0.228) (0.105) (0.135) 
Post -0.107 0.351 0.359 0.348 
 (0.215) (0.243) (0.241) (0.245) 
Interaction -0.670** -0.646** -0.668** -0.551** 
 (0.115) (0.110) (0.106) (0.101) 
Married  6.12** 6.89** 6.88** 
  (0.677) (0.539) (0.534) 
Male child  0.0989 0.0921 0.0921 
  (0.0495) (0.0508) (0.0507) 
Single birth  -1.58** -1.53** -1.53** 
  (0.232) (0.211) (0.211) 
State fixed effects  Y Y 
Month of birth  Y Y 
Legal drinking   Y 
Observations 1,486,782 1,486,256 1,486,256 1,486,256 
R-squared 0.001 0.011 0.031 0.031 
Notes: Data come from the Birth Records from National Vital Statistics System. Sample include births 
given by mothers of age 16-19, in years 1982 to 1986. Reported coefficients are factored by 100.  
Standard errors are clustered by state, reported in parenthesis. * and ** denote 5% and 1% significant 
level, respectively.   
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Table 2-3c: Difference-in-differences: early prenatal care; blacks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treatment 1.18** 0.854** 0.910** 0.569** 
 (0.178) (0.210) (0.161) (0.199) 
Post -0.539 -0.515 -0.743* -0.748* 
 (0.404) (0.401) (0.352) (0.354) 
Interaction -0.155 -0.107 -0.133 0.0172 
 (0.232) (0.237) (0.230) (0.225) 
Married  3.17** 3.43** 3.39** 
  (0.519) (0.306) (0.297) 
Male child  0.183** 0.181** 0.181** 
  (0.0647) (0.0658) (0.0656) 
Single birth  -1.64** -1.66** -1.66** 
  (0.354) (0.356) (0.355) 
State fixed effects  Y Y 
Month of birth  Y Y 
Legal drinking   Y 
Observations 565,962 565,844 565,844 565,844 
R-squared 0.000 0.001 0.022 0.022 
Notes: Data come from the Birth Records from National Vital Statistics System. Sample include births 
given by mothers of age 16-19, in years 1982 to 1986. Reported coefficients are factored by 100.  
Standard errors are clustered by state, reported in parenthesis. * and ** denote 5% and 1% significant 
level, respectively.   
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Table 2-4a: Difference-in-differences: Low birth weight; whole sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treatment -1.48** -0.963** -0.936** -0.768** 
 (0.0876) (0.0557) (0.0537) (0.0654) 
Post -0.336** -0.426** -0.375** -0.276** 
 (0.122) (0.0914) (0.0793) (0.0656) 
Interaction 0.207* 0.155 0.153 0.0806 
 (0.0862) (0.0836) (0.0823) (0.0890) 
Black  5.62** 5.45** 5.45** 
  (0.527) (0.502) (0.502) 
White  0.665 0.696 0.696 
  (0.541) (0.511) (0.509) 
Married  -1.49** -1.61** -1.61** 
  (0.135) (0.121) (0.120) 
Male child  -1.09** -1.09** -1.09** 
  (0.0586) (0.0589) (0.0590) 
Single birth  -56.7** -6.7** -0.56.7** 
  (0.364) (0.365) (0.365) 
State fixed effects  Y Y 
Month of birth  Y Y 
Legal drinking   Y 
Observations 2,162,933 2,150,047 2,150,047 2,150,047 
R-squared 0.001 0.061 0.062 0.062 
Notes: Data come from the Birth Records from National Vital Statistics System. Sample include births 
given by mothers of age 16-19, in years 1982 to 1986. Reported coefficients are factored by 100.  
Standard errors are clustered by state, reported in parenthesis. * and ** denote 5% and 1% significant 
level, respectively.   
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Table 2-4b: Difference-in-differences: Low birth weight; whites only 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treatment -1.28** -1.16** -1.12** -0.928** 
 (0.0845) (0.0677) (0.0631) (0.0729) 
Post -0.255* -0.397** -0.331** -0.269** 
 (0.121) (0.109) (0.0768) (0.0677) 
Interaction 0.221* 0.249** 0.243** 0.160 
 (0.103) (0.0894) (0.0870) (0.0882) 
Married  -1.40** -1.55** -1.54** 
  (0.143) (0.116) (0.115) 
Male child  -0.651** -0.652** -0.652** 
  (0.0379) (0.0382) (0.0382) 
Single birth  -55.7** -55.7** -55.7** 
  (0.00464) (0.00465) (0.466) 
State fixed effects  Y Y 
Month of birth  Y Y 
Legal drinking   Y 
Observations 1,521,812 1,521,238 1,521,238 1,521,238 
R-squared 0.000 0.055 0.056 0.056 
Notes: Data come from the Birth Records from National Vital Statistics System. Sample include births 
given by mothers of age 16-19, in years 1982 to 1986. Reported coefficients are factored by 100.  
Standard errors are clustered by state, reported in parenthesis. * and ** denote 5% and 1% significant 
level, respectively.   
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Table 2-4c: Difference-in-differences: Low birth weight; blacks only 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treatment -0.500** -0.528** -0.527** -0.386** 
 (0.0975) (0.0784) (0.0767) (0.0942) 
Post -0.430* -0.480** -0.464** -0.249 
 (0.178) (0.174) (0.173) (0.168) 
Interaction -0.114 -0.136 -0.137 -0.200 
 (0.168) (0.159) (0.159) (0.171) 
Married  -1.97** -2.01** -2.00** 
  (0.145) (0.146) (0.144) 
Male child  -2.29** -2.29** -2.29** 
  (0.119) (0.119) (0.119) 
Single birth  -59.0** -58.9** -58.9** 
  (0.603) (0.601) (0.600) 
State fixed effects  Y Y 
Month of birth  Y Y 
Legal drinking   Y 
Observations 583,322 583,180 583,180 583,180 
R-squared 0.000 0.050 0.051 0.051 
Notes: Data come from the Birth Records from National Vital Statistics System. Sample include births 
given by mothers of age 16-19, in years 1982 to 1986. Reported coefficients are factored by 100.  
Standard errors are clustered by state, reported in parenthesis. * and ** denote 5% and 1% significant 
level, respectively.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
101 
 
Table 2-5: Difference-in-differences: sample restricted to births occurred in states that did not 
provide Medicaid to first time pregnant population. 
 Early Prenatal Care LBW 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Whole sample White Black Whole sample White Black 
Treatment 1.86** 2.09** 1.75** -1.70** -1.80** -1.52** 
 (0.247) (0.273) (0.392) (0.130) (0.152) (0.233) 
Post -0.0405 0.419 -0.443 -0.289 -0.160 -0.468 
 (0.336) (0.458) (0.476) (0.147) (0.181) (0.308) 
Interaction -0.289 -0.509 -0.327 0.111 0.0041 0.131 
 (0.270) (0.325) (0.481) (0.210) (0.220) (0.350) 
Black 1.81   6.07**   
 (1.13)   (0.493)   
White 2.71**   1.16*   
 (0.848)   (0.490)   
Married 6.43** 6.97** 4.64** -2.28** -2.16** -2.80** 
 (0.461) (0.606) (0.505) (0.166) (0.181) (0.219) 
Male child 0.0728 0.0469 0.103 -1.65** -1.21** -2.53** 
 (0.0707) (0.0884) (0.133) (0.0816) (0.085) (0.114) 
Single birth -4.48** -4.48** -4.65** -55.8** -54.8** -57.9** 
 (0.579) (0.743) (0.481) (0.382) (0.487) (0.589) 
State fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Month of birth Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Legal drinking Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 643,401 411,795 217,169 663,954 423,743 224,666 
R-squared 0.037 0.042 0.028 0.100 0.104 0.079 
Notes: Data come from the Birth Records from National Vital Statistics System. Sample include births 
given by mothers of age 16-19, in years 1982 to 1986. Reported coefficients are factored by 100.  
Standard errors are clustered by state, reported in parenthesis. * and ** denote 5% and 1% significant 
level, respectively.   
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Table 2-6: Difference-in-differences: sample restricted to first birth. 
 Early Prenatal Care LBW 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Whole sample White Black Whole sample White Black 
Treatment 1.52** 1.50** 1.70** -0.815** -0.949** -0.472** 
 (0.0957) (0.125) (0.167) (0.0710) (0.0757) (0.132) 
Post 0.0596 0.407** -0.781* -0.311** -0.314** -0.237 
 (0.158) (0.145) (0.355) (0.0858) (0.0843) (0.205) 
Interaction -0.148 -0.431** 0.376 0.101 0.219** -0.311 
 (0.118) (0.121) (0.196) (0.0765) (0.0771) (0.169) 
Black 4.33**   4.92**   
 (0.757)   (0.587)   
White 3.19**   0.678   
 (0.444)   (0.599)   
Married 6.85** 7.33** 3.64** -1.47** -1.44** -1.66** 
 (0.488) (0.581) (0.296) (0.114) (0.105) (0.230) 
Male child 0.126* 0.0882 0.191 -0.836** -0.433** -2.12** 
 (0.0528) (0.0559) (0.0997) (0.0569) (0.0387) (0.140) 
Single birth -2.29** -2.29** -2.35** -56.7** -55.9** -58.7** 
 (0.298) (0.379) (0.442) (0.528) (0.596) (1.06) 
State fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Month of birth Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Legal drinking Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 1,452,874 1,074,987 348,793 1,486,895 1,098,069 358,656 
R-squared 0.029 0.032 0.024 0.036 0.032 0.027 
Notes: Data come from the Birth Records from National Vital Statistics System. Sample include births 
given by mothers of age 16-19, in years 1982 to 1986. Reported coefficients are factored by 100.  
Standard errors are clustered by state, reported in parenthesis. * and ** denote 5% and 1% significant 
level, respectively.   
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Chapter 3: Medicaid Nursing Home Care and Elderly Asset Transfer: Evidence from the 
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 
1. Introduction   
Social welfare programs, which target at promoting the well-being of the disadvantaged 
population, are potentially associated with behavior distortions. Almost all social welfare 
programs are provided to people with limited income and resources. Theoretically, the eligibility 
schemes generate a disincentive for individuals to accumulate income or saving. Empirically, 
literature finds evidence that social welfare programs lead to reduction in labor supply and 
saving for various target populations.45 This study investigates how the provision of public 
insurance affects the asset holding behavior among the elderly.  
For the elderly population, one of the biggest uninsured financial burdens is the huge cost 
of long-term care (Brown and Finkelstein 2008). The average cost of nursing home stay is as 
high as $6,000 to $7,000 per month as of 2010.46 Such high cost would exhaust one’s resources 
quickly.47 When private sources of payment (out-of-pocket or private insurance) exhaust, the 
public insurance – namely Medicaid – takes over as the source of support for long-term care 
needs.  
Despite its effectiveness as safety net for the elderly, Medicaid provision for long-term 
care needs raises concerns of policy makers. One particular worry is that the means-tested nature 
of Medicaid may discourage saving, which leads to less asset accumulation and lower quality of 
                                                          
45 Krueger and Meyer (2002) provide comprehensive review of the literature on the relationship between social 
insurance and labor supply. For the effect of public insurance on saving, see Gruber and Yelowitz (1999) and Kuan 
and Chen (2003, 2013). 
46 Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. http://longtermcare.gov/costs-how-to-pay/costs-of-care/ 
47 As of 2010, only 14% of elderly are covered by private long-term care insurance (Health and Retirement Survey). 
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the care received.48 At the same time, souring government spending imposes fiscal pressure at 
both the federal and the state levels. Understanding behavior distortion associated with Medicaid 
provision is crucial for policy design. 
This study empirically examines the association between Medicaid policy and asset 
holding behavior of the elderly. Specially, I examine whether Medicaid nursing home care 
coverage induces the elderly to strategically reduce their asset level. One particular behavior 
margin – and the focus of this study – is to transfer their resources to their children.  
To establish causal relationship, I exploit variation in Medicaid eligibility generated by 
an exogenous policy shock: the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005. The policy imposed stricter 
penalty to asset transfer behavior when one seeks Medicaid coverage. The change led to less 
leeway for the elderly to make inter-vivos transfer in anticipation of Medicaid needs. If the 
elderly were “gaming” with the Medicaid system by strategically transfer their assets, we would 
expect such transfer to drop significantly after the policy change. 
The main data come from the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS), survey years 2000 to 
2008. The HRS provide rich longitudinal information for the elderly population. Importantly, 
individuals are asked to report the history of making financial transfers to their children. 
Additionally, they are asked about their subjective nursing home entry expectation. The main 
analysis relies on the two pieces of information. 
Empirically, I use a difference-in-differences method. The choice of the treatment and 
control groups is based on one’s perceived nursing home entry risk. The treatment group 
includes individuals who self-report having positive nursing home entry anticipation, thus are 
                                                          
48 For the relationship between Medicaid coverage and nursing home care quality, see Grabowski (2003) and 
Grabowski et al. (2004). 
105 
 
most likely affected by the policy change. The control group includes individuals who self-report 
having no nursing home entry anticipation, thus are unlikely directly affected by the policy 
change.  
The findings suggest that the DRA2005 had significant effect on the asset transfer 
behavior of the elderly. The treatment group – individuals who perceived positive nursing home 
entry risk – reduced the likelihood of making a gift/transfer that exceeds $500 to children or 
grandchildren by 3.2 to 4 percentage points. The result is robust across demographic groups, and 
is more pronounced among groups with highest nursing home entry risk. 
The findings provide suggestive evidence of moral hazard in the context of Medicaid 
nursing home care coverage: the elderly population is indeed aware of the public provision 
option and gaming with the system. Such behavior distortion increases burden of public 
expenditure on long-term care. The policy intervention to eliminate such “gaming” opportunities 
is shown to be effective.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides background information 
on the institutional setting of Medicaid nursing home coverage, the policy change and informal 
evidence of the effect of policy. Section 3 summarizes previous literature on relevant issues. 
Section 4 describes the data source and the key variables used. Section 5 outlines the empirical 
method. Section 6 provides the results and robustness checks. Finally, section 7 concludes. 
2. Backgrounds 
2.1 Medicaid nursing home care provision 
The cost for institutionalized long-term care is a big component of the elderly’s 
consumption portfolio. Four out of ten elderly decedents have used nursing home for some time 
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over the life course (Kemper and Murtaugh 1991). The average annual cost of nursing home care 
can be as high as $78,000 for a semi-private room.49 Such cost is a financial burden for the 
elderly, who has limited income after retirement. 
Normally, people reply on out-of-pocket payments and private insurance as the first 
method of payment.50 When the private resources exhaust, Medicaid takes over as the secondary 
payer. Due to the significant annual cost and the long-term nature of nursing home needs, 
Medicaid serves as the largest payer for nursing home care. According to the reports by the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Service, Medicaid and other forms of public insurance cover 
more than half of the aggregate cost.51   
To be eligible for Medicaid, one needs to meet the requirements for income and asset 
levels. For income requirements, the applicant for Medicaid cannot have any source of income 
above a certain threshold. For asset requirements, the applicant must demonstrate that the total 
asset he/she possesses is below a certain threshold at the time of application. Both income and 
asset thresholds are set at state level. For potential beneficiaries, who are institutionalized 
elderly, the income requirement is often met. However, the asset threshold is sometimes binding 
(Norton 1995). As of 2009, 30 states set the asset limit at $2,000 for individual applicants and 
$3,000 for couples (Kaiser Foundation 2010). When one’s asset is deemed above the threshold, 
he/she must use the asset to pay for nursing home cost first, and seek Medicaid coverage when 
the remaining asset is exhausted.  
                                                          
49 Source: Metlife Mature Market Institute, 2011. 
50 The market for private long-term care insurance is very small. As of 2010, only 8.9% of the national total cost of 
long-term care is covered by private insurance (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Service). 
51 The other public programs covering nursing home cost include veteran specific programs and Medicare. Medicare 
covers nursing home cost when it is medically necessary and imposes a cap of 100 days to the length of full or 
partial coverage. 
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The two unique feature of Medicaid, being the secondary payer and means-tested, impose 
an implicit tax on the asset of the elderly who intent to seek Medicaid coverage. Coe (2007) 
summarizes Medicaid coverage as an insurance with deductible equal to savings and income 
above the eligibility limits. Anecdotally, there are two ways the elderly could respond to avoid 
the embedded tax: reduce saving overall, or make inter-vivos transfer to children. This study 
focuses on the latter.  
2.2 The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 
The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 was signed by the President in February 2006. The 
DRA2005 makes the biggest change to financial eligibility of Medicaid nursing home coverage 
since the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988. It affects the elderly who seek Medicaid 
nursing home coverage in two ways: imposed stricter penalty to asset transfer and set limits for 
housing equity and other form of resources (ex. annuity) which was previous exempted from the 
asset test.  
The first and most direct change made by the DRA 2005 is the modification to the 
penalty associated with pre-application asset transfer. Medicaid rule designed to discourage 
strategic asset transfer behavior is a “look-back period”, which specifies a certain time window 
prior to Medicaid application. Any asset transferred at below market value during the look-back 
period is deemed violating Medicaid regulation. If a transfer was made and detected, a penalty 
period would be triggered based on the amount of the transfer. During this penalty period, the 
elderly would not have access to Medicaid.  
Effective as it seems, the penalty period prior to 2006 could be avoided by strategic 
timing of the transfer (Liu and Waidmann 2005). This is possible because the start of the penalty 
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period was on the date of the transfer, not on the date of Medicaid application.  For example, if a 
transfer was made on Jan 1, 2005 and the individual applies for Medicaid on Jun 1, 2005. 
Medicaid asset test determines that a penalty period of 4 months is triggered.52 However, since 
the penalty period starts on the date of the transfer (Jan 1, 2005), the individual is in fact not 
affected by the penalty when he seeks coverage 6 months later (Jun 1, 2005).  
 The loophole of the design of penalty was closed by the DRA 2005, as it moveed the start 
date of penalty period to the date of Medicaid application (Jun 1, 2005 in previous example). In 
the meantime, the length of the “look-back period” was extended from 36 months to 60 months, 
making it harder to plan.  
   The policy also set limits on the housing equity and other form of resources (ex. annuity) 
that was previously exempt from the asset test. Owner-occupied housing equity is exempt from 
the asset test when one first apply for Medicaid. However, the Medicaid Estate Recovery 
programs allow states to collect the housing once the beneficiaries pass away. These programs, 
which were adopted by most states prior to 2005, ensure that housing assets cannot be exempt 
from compensating nursing home costs in the end.53 The DRA 2005 imposed caps to the value of 
housing equity. The total amount of equity allowed to keep was set a high level: $500,000, with 
states’ option to raise it to $750,000.  For most of the population this study focuses on, their 
housing equity is far below the cap.  
                                                          
52 The length of the penalty period is determined based on the amount of the transfer and the average nursing home 
cost incurs 
53 Greenhalgh-Stanley (2012) provides discussion of the effects of the estate recovery programs on homeownership 
among the elderly. The findings suggest that states’ adoption of the program significantly reduced the likelihood that 
resources be avoided by keeping resources in the form of housing.  
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Overall, the DRA2005 is expected to have direct effect on the asset transfer behavior of 
the elderly with higher nursing home entry risks. In the meantime, the policy is unlikely to have 
direct effect on the behavior of elderly who has low nursing home entry risk. The nature of the 
policy creates a quasi-experimental setting for empirical analysis.  
Figure 1 provides evidence for the effects of the DRA 2005. I plot the share of 
households that made transfer during the two-year survey window against survey year. I split the 
sample based on risk factors of nursing home use. The high nursing home entry risk groups are 
defined based on the subjective risk factors: having a catastrophic health shock (stroke), having 
difficulty of daily activities (ADLs) and having mental health problems (depression).54  The rest 
of the population, denoted as the comparison group, is plotted separately. The simple time series 
trends suggest that the groups with high nursing home entry risk reduced their asset transfer 
behavior after 2006. Formal analysis is performed in section 6 to quantify the effect.   
3. Literature review 
Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995) is one of the early works that establishes the 
theoretical framework of how Medicaid nursing home care coverage affects elderly saving 
behavior. The study builds on a life cycle model of household wealth accumulation, which 
explicitly includes the asset-based, means-tested social insurance. The model demonstrates that 
asset-based social insurance has a negative effect on asset accumulation, especially for low-
income households.   
Empirical evidence for the effect of Medicaid on saving among the elderly population has 
remained understudied. One set of literature tries to identify the effect based on structural 
                                                          
54 These factors are significant predictors for nursing home admission: Gaugler et al. (2007), Cai et al. (2009). 
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framework. Feinstein and Ho (2000), for example, further extends the idea of life cycle model by 
detailing asset management in terms of saving, spend-down and gift giving. Though their work 
does not explicitly focus on the effect of Medicaid, it provides indirect evidence that negative 
health shock, which potentially increases need for Medicaid and increases the likelihood of asset 
spending down.  
A different set of literature builds their identification strategy on exploiting cross 
sectional variation in terms of perceived nursing home entry risk of elderly individuals. Basset 
(2007), for example, documents a positive relationship between self-assessed nursing home entry 
risk and the likelihood of making a gift/transfer to children. However, one concern with 
interpreting the correlation as causal is the omitted variable bias. An individual may report high 
nursing home entry expectation because her child is in financial hardship and unable to provide 
informal care. This individual may at the same time be more likely to give the child financial 
help. The correlation may reflect mechanisms other than Medicaid eligibility, thus a causal 
interpretation is problematic.  
To capture causality rather than correlation, one needs to exploit variation in Medicaid 
rules. Coe (2007) studies the financial response of the elderly to Medicaid by jointly exploiting 
two sources of variation: individual level variation in nursing home entry expectation and state 
level variation in program generosity. By generating an IV method, she finds that elderly do shift 
their consumption and asset allocation in response to Medicaid.  
This study takes a similar approach as Coe (2007). The identification strategy replies on 
exogenous policy shock in Medicaid eligibility by the Deficit Reduction Act 2005. The nature of 
the policy change ensures that the estimation result reflects a causal relationship between 
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Medicaid eligibility and asset allocation choice. By utilizing the panel aspect of the longitudinal 
data set, it also avoids most of the omitted variable bias that previous literatures have. 
4. Data and sample 
The main data come from the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS). The HRS is a 
longitudinal dataset conducted every other year. The survey provides comprehensive information 
on a nationally representative sample of elderly. The HRS is well suited for the study of elderly 
asset allocation decisions as it contains not only direct measures of income and wealth, but also 
sufficient information on the dynamics of health conditions, choice of insurance and care 
utilization.   
The main outcome of interest is the asset transfer behavior of the elderly. Such behavior 
is directly asked in the HRS: for each financial respondent, he/she is asked whether he/she gave 
financial help or gifts of $500 or more to any child or grandchild during the past two years. If the 
answer is yes, the respondent is further asked to specify the amount of transfer made. In 2006, on 
average 38% of the sample report having transferred some financial asset or gift. The average 
amount of transfer is $4,500. For all transfers, 31% exceeded $5,000. This suggests that such 
form of asset transfer could play a significant role in manipulating asset levels in response to 
Medicaid asset test.  
Another main variable is the individual expectation of nursing home entry risk. This is 
measured by one’s response to the question asking expected probability of entering nursing 
home in the next five years. The respondent is asked to report a numerical expectation ranging 
from zero to 100, which I rescale to a probability between zero and one. This measure is reflects 
people’s perception of potential health condition as well as attitude towards nursing home 
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utilization. This perception measure is more accurate reflection of risk than demographic 
controls as it directly links to behavior response.55   
Other control variables for regression analysis include standard demographic 
information: age, gender, race, educational level, marital status, number of children, and the 
region of residence. I also use a set of variables to measure health condition. These variables 
include self-reported health status, whether having difficulties in Activities of Daily Living 
(ADLs) and nursing home utilization.  
I restrict the sample to respondents born in or before 1936. By doing so, I ensure that 
almost all observations are at least at the age of 70, mostly retired and preparing for long term 
care arrangement around the time of the policy shock. The sample cohorts utilized in this study 
include the initial HRS cohort (born 1931 to 1941), the AHEAD cohort (born before 1924) and 
the Children of Depression (CODA) cohort (born 1924 to 1930). I also restrict the sample to 
financial respondents, which ensures that one observation is taken per household. This study uses 
data from 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008, though only the data of 2006 and 2008 is used for 
quantitative analysis. 
5. Empirical methodology 
The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of Medicaid nursing home care 
coverage on the asset transfer behavior of the elderly. As discussed in previous sections, the 
methodological difficulty is that the decisions to make asset transfer and to enter nursing home 
are made jointly. For example, people may substitute nursing home care using informal care 
                                                          
55 Lindrooth et al. (2000) and Finkelstein and McGarry (2005) discuss the justification of using subjective 
measurement for nursing home entry expectation. 
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provided by their children. This group would also more likely compensate their children with 
monetary transfer. This would generate a negative correlation between Medicaid nursing home 
care use and asset transfer, which do not represent causal relationship.  
To establish causal relationship, I exploit variation in Medicaid eligibility generated by 
the policy change imposed by DRA2005. The policy change would directly affect one’s asset 
allocation decision, if this individual foresees nursing home entry risk in the near future. On the 
other hand, the policy would not have direct impact on individuals who do not anticipate nursing 
home needs in the near future. I use the latter group as the counterfactual.  
Empirically, I follow a difference-in-differences approach. The treatment group and the 
control group are defined based on individuals’ subjective nursing home entry risks. To ensure 
that the reported nursing home entry expectation is not endogenous to the policy shock in 2006, I 
use the pre-policy nursing home entry expectation (of year 2004) to determine treatment status.  
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of demographics of the two groups. These 
demographic characteristics are measured in 2006. The treatment group reports positive expected 
nursing home entry probability in 2004 while the comparison group reports zero expected 
nursing home entry probability in 2004. A few facts are worth noting: first, the treatment and 
comparison groups are similar in average age and gender composition. Second, the treatment 
group on average have fewer children. Third, the treatment group are more likely white and have 
college degree or above, suggesting that they are more likely of higher social economic status. 
Finally, both groups show similar pattern in report being in poor health. The treatment group, 
however, are less likely to report being in excellent health.  
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These observed differences between the two groups reflect factors that are associated 
with nursing home needs: the group with nursing home entry expectation are on average of 
worse health, have potentially worse access to informal care provided by children, and 
potentially have more wealth to compensate nursing home needs. One potential concern for 
identification is that the observed differences may lead to systematically different outcomes for 
the two groups. I address the concern by gradually including controls for the observed 
differences to examine the robustness of the results.    
To quantify the policy effect, I perform the following Probit specification:  
(1)      Pr{transfer_childrenit} = α + β1NH_expectationi + β2Post_policyt +
 β3NH_expectation ∗ Post_policyit + β4Xit + ϵit 
The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether a transfer of $500 or more was made 
during the past two years. The right hand variables include a treatment dummy 
(NH_expectation) that equals one if the observation is in the treatment group (positive nursing 
home expectation in 2004), zero otherwise; a policy dummy (Post_policy) equals one if the 
observation is made in 2008, zero if the observation is in 2006; a time policy interaction term 
(NH_expectation ∗ Post_policy) and a set of control variables. The coefficient of interest, 𝛽3, 
captures the effect of the policy.   
The main identification assumption of the difference-in-differences method is that the 
treatment group would have the same trend in asset transfer behavior as the comparison group, 
absent of the policy shock. To examine the validity of this assumption, I graphically plot the time 
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trend of asset transfer behavior of the two groups using data from 2000 to 2008.56 The time 
trends are shown in Figure 2. On average, the treatment group has a higher probability of 
making a transfer to their children or grandchildren. Prior to the policy change in 2006, the two 
groups have similar time trends in asset transfer behavior. This provides support to the validity of 
the identification assumption: there did not seem to be systematic difference in the time trends of 
asset transfer behavior over time between the treatment group and the comparison group. After 
the policy shock, the treatment group on average reduced their transfer, while the comparison 
group shows no significant drop. Such pattern provide graphically illustration of the treatment 
effect.  
Additionally, the validity of the DID method requires that the relative change in asset 
transfer behavior between the two groups cannot be explained by factors other than the policy 
change. One potential concern is that the treatment group may develop worse health conditions 
over time, relative to the comparison group. If so, the drop in asset transfer behavior of the 
treatment group could be the result of the increasing medical cost. To test this possibility, I 
examine the trends in health condition and actual nursing home utilization of the two groups. 
Figure 3 shows the time trends for three different measurements of interest. First, self-reported 
health condition is shown in panel A, ranking from one to five, with one denote being in perfect 
health and five denote being in poor health. Both groups overall show a worsened health 
condition over the period of interest. There is no significant difference of the two groups, 
especially for the time around 2006. Panel B plots the time trend of difficulties in Activities of 
Daily Living (ADLs). Again, both groups have similar trends over time. Panel C plots the actual 
                                                          
56 The HRS provides information on asset transfer as early as 1998, but a large part of the observations were not 
retired nor near retirement. Including this wave would cause complications irrelevant to the purpose of this study. 
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nursing home utilization rate of the two groups. Both groups show increasing nursing home use 
with similar time trends. The treatment group does have a higher nursing home utilization. 
However, the difference of utilization appears as early as 2004, is time persistent and 
comparatively small in magnitude, thus unlikely to be the cause of the sudden change in asset 
transfer behavior observed for the treatment group after 2006. In the regression analysis in 
section 6, I include controls for health conditions and nursing home utilization for robustness 
check. 
Another potential confounding factor is that the macroeconomic condition may affect the 
two groups in different ways. One story consistent with the observed pattern is that the treatment 
group appears to be of higher social economic conditions. The wealthier group would be more 
likely hurt in the financial crisis around 2006, as a higher portion of their asset tends to be 
invested in high-risk assets. To test if the financial crisis was instead driving the results, I plot the 
time trend of asset transfer behavior for different educational attainment groups in Figure 4. For 
different educational groups (high school dropouts, high school and some college, college and 
above), the time trends of average asset transfer are similar both before and after the policy 
change. This provides inconclusive but suggestive evidence that macroeconomic condition is 
unlikely an explanation of the drop in asset transfer of the treatment group.  
6. Results and robustness checks 
6.1 Baseline results 
The results of the baseline specification following equation (1) are shown in Table 2. The 
coefficients reported are marginal effects.57 Standard errors are clustered at individual level. In 
                                                          
57 The marginal effects of the interaction term is calculated based on Norton et al. (2004). 
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column 1, I show the results of a specification with no additional controls. The results represent a 
quantitative illustration of the pattern in Figure 2. The coefficient of interest, the one of the 
interaction term, suggests that the treatment group reduced the probability of making a financial 
transfer to children or grandchildren by 3.25 percentage points after the policy change. The 
magnitude represents a 9% decrease of the baseline likelihood of making a transfer.  
To take into account the observed differences in demographics between the treatment and 
the control groups, I further include a set of demographic controls. These control variables 
include age, age square, educational attainment, gender, race, marital status and number of 
children. As shown in column 2, the inclusion of demographic controls does not change the 
magnitude and the statistical significance of the estimate.  
Column 3 further includes census region controls. These are included to control for 
geographical variation in Medicaid eligibility and generosity. As discussed in the background 
section, states vary in the income and asset limits when determining Medicaid eligibility. The 
income and asset limits may directly affect perceived nursing home entry risk as well as asset 
holding behavior. State identifier is not available in the public use version of the HRS. I instead 
use census region indicators as proxy. The estimate is robust. 
The preferred specification in Column 4 further includes controls for health conditions. 
Three sets of controls are included: self-reported health condition, level of difficulties with ADLs 
and the use of nursing home in the past two years. Again, the estimate is robust. The results 
suggest that, the treatment group reduced asset transfer behavior by 3.2 percentage points 
relative to the comparison group as the result of the policy change. 
6.2 Alternative treatment and comparison groups 
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The baseline specification divides the whole sample into the treatment and comparison 
based on having zero or positive expected nursing home entry risk. One concern with the choices 
of treatment and comparison groups is the potential measurement error in self-reports. People 
tend to give round number as answers to the survey question. Additionally, individuals who 
report a small value of probability, such as 0.01, may in fact indicate no nursing home entry 
expectation.  
To address these issues, I examine the robustness of the estimates using alternative 
probability cutoffs to determine treatment and comparison groups. Following Coe (2007) and 
Finkelstein and McGarry (2005), I use 0.1 and 0.5. The rationale of such division is that even 
though a numerical value for reported nursing home entry risk may not accurately measure an 
individual’s belief, it provides sufficient information of the individual’s perception in a 
categorical manner. In other words, when an individual report a probability of 0.6, it may not 
indicate that this individual is facing a higher probability than someone who reports 0.4, but 
reflects that this individual sees herself as having high nursing home entry risk in the near future.  
I perform the difference-in-differences specifications using the alternative treatment and 
comparison groups. The results are shown in Table 3 and Table 4. For all specifications with 
various sets of control variables, the results suggest that policy change led to a drop in asset 
transfer behavior among the treatment group. The magnitudes of the treatment effect range from 
3.6 percentage points to 4.1 percentage points. Moreover, the policy effect is more pronounced 
for the group with the highest self-reported nursing home entry risk (Table 4). Such pattern is 
consistent with the intuition that the most affected group is those who are entering nursing home 
in the nearest future. 
6.3 Subgroup analysis 
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This section examines how the effects of the policy change differ across various 
demographic groups. To test the robustness of the result across different demographic groups, I 
further split sample based on age, educational level and gender of the respondent. The results 
using different subgroup are reported in Table 5. Each column reports the marginal effects using 
the preferred specification with the full set of control variables.  
Columns 1 and 2 show how the effects differ across age groups. I split the sample based 
on their age in 2006. The results suggest that the estimated treatment effect in the baseline 
specification is primarily driven by the elderly of ages 70 to 80. For the oldest olds, who are of 
age greater than 80 in 2006, the policy change did not have significant effect. This suggest that 
the oldest olds were not as sensitive as younger cohorts were to Medicaid eligibility, which may 
reflect their lack of cognition ability.  
Column 3 and 4 show how the effects differ for individuals with varied educational 
attainments. The results suggest that high school dropouts are most responsive to the policy 
change. Such pattern is consistent with findings in previous literature (Basset 2007, Goda et al 
2011) that the less educated group has lower income and asset level, and is more likely to rely on 
Medicaid. Such group is more likely the marginal individuals affected by the policy changes of 
Medicaid eligibility. 
Column 5 and 6 display the effects of the policy change on male and female, 
respectively. The results suggest that the treatment effects are consistent for the male and the 
female subgroups.  
7. Conclusion and Discussion 
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This study examines the effect of Medicaid coverage for nursing home care cost on the 
asset allocation of the elderly. In particular, I examine whether the means-tested nature of 
Medicaid induces the elderly to transfer their resources away to their children. To establish 
causal relationship, I rely on a policy change in DRA2005, which imposed strict penalty on asset 
transfer behavior prior to Medicaid application. I perform a difference-in-differences approach 
using data from the Health and Retirement Survey. I find that the policy change significantly 
reduced the likelihood of inter-vivos transfer among the elderly who anticipated nursing home 
entry in the near future.  
The results provide supportive evidence that Medicaid provision leads to behavior 
distortions among the elderly. In particular, potential beneficiaries of Medicaid would 
strategically reduce their asset level in order to qualify for the coverage. One possible avenue to 
reduce the asset level is to transfer the asset to their children. Findings in this study also suggest 
that regulatory change targeted at eliminating such behavior – enforcing strict penalty when asset 
transfer is detected – seems to be effective.  
 A major limitation of the study is the potential reporting errors in the self-reported asset 
transfer. One particular worry is that the reporting error may be directly affected by the 
respondent’s’ perception of the policy change. Knowing that making transfer to children may 
trigger stricter penalty, individuals who anticipate nursing home needs may underreport any 
transfer history even though they did not change their true behavior. Alternative data source that 
documents asset transfer behavior, for example tax return files, may provide a better description 
of true behavior than the self-reports. 
 There are two important yet unaddressed questions for future analysis. First, the analysis 
extended to two years after the policy change. It remains unclear whether the drop in asset 
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transfer in the observed period reflects an overall reduction of inter-vivos transfer, or instead 
reflects a shift in timing of the transfer. The difficulty associated with conducting long-term 
analysis is the nature of the population: the targeted group of Medicaid nursing home care 
coverage are the elderly who are very old and would decease relatively quickly. Thus, extending 
the study period is at the cost of reduction in size and change in composition of the sample.  
 Second, it remains unclear whether the drop in gift giving reflects a true reduction in 
asset avoidance. One possible alternative to gift giving is to preserve assets through trusts. 
According to Medicaid regulations, resources put in irrevocable trusts are exempt from asset test, 
but are subject to the look back period and the associated penalty. On the one hand, having strict 
penalties would potentially reduce asset avoidance through trust. On the other hand, the elderly 
may potentially respond to the policy change by planning ahead and establish trust before the 
five years look back period. Greenhalgh-Stanley (2012) provide evidence that the elderly would 
seek alternative source of asset transfer, when the housing equity is no longer exempt from 
reimbursing Medicaid. Additional research is needed to understand the effect of the policy on 
alternative behavior margins. 
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Figure 3-1: Time trends: share of respondents made a transfer of $500 or more during the past two 
years, by health conditions. 
 
 
Notes: Data come from Health and Retirement Survey, survey years 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008. 
Sample include all financial respondents who responded to the question regarding asset transfer. The 
full sample is split into four groups: “Stroke” includes individuals who were diagnosed stroke since last 
interview; “ADL” includes individuals who reported having difficulties in Activities of Daily Living for the 
first time since last interview; “Depressed” includes individuals who reported feeling depressed since 
last interview; “Comparison” includes all other individuals. 
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Figure 3-2: Time trends: share of respondents made a transfer of $500 or more during the past two 
years; by treatment status. 
 
 
Notes: Data come from Health and Retirement Survey, survey years 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008. 
Sample include all financial respondents who responded to the question regarding asset transfer. The 
treatment group consists of respondents who reported positive nursing home entry probability in 2004. 
The comparison group consists of respondents who reported zero nursing home entry probability in 
2004. 
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Figure 3-3: Time trends of health condition and nursing home care utilization: 2000-2008 
A: Self-reported health. 
 
B: Difficulty of Activities of Daily Living (ADLs) 
 
C: Long-term nursing home stay (30 days or longer) 
 
Notes: Data come from Health and Retirement Survey, survey years 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008. Sample 
include all financial respondents who responded to the question regarding asset transfer. The treatment group 
consists of respondents who reported positive nursing home entry probability in 2004. The comparison group 
consists of respondents who reported zero nursing home entry probability in 2004. 
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Figure 3-4: Time trends for asset transfer behavior by educational attainment: 2000-2008. 
 
Notes: Data come from Health and Retirement Survey, survey years 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008. 
Sample include all financial respondents who responded to the question regarding asset transfer. 
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Table 3-1: Summary of characteristics (in 2006), by treatment status 
 Control group Treatment group 
Age 77.32 78.37 
 (6.388) (6.610) 
Number of children 3.546 3.182 
 (2.449) (2.157) 
HS/GED 0.344 0.330 
 (0.475) (0.47) 
Some college 0.186 0.195 
 (0.389) (0.396) 
College degree and above 0.141 0.242 
 (0.348) (0.428) 
White 0.820 0.883 
 (0.385) (0.321) 
Married 0.398 0.420 
 (0.49) (0.494) 
Male 0.410 0.426 
 (0.492) (0.495) 
Excellent health 0.093 0.069 
 (0.29) (0.254) 
Poor health 0.097 0.099 
 (0.296) (0.299) 
# of obs. 2571 2350 
Notes: Sample include financial respondents born in or before 1936, and have responded to the 
question regarding nursing home anticipation in 2004. The outcome variables are measured in 2006. 
Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 3-2: Baseline results.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
NH expectation 0.065*** 0.0364*** 0.0359*** 0.0378*** 
 (0.0137) (0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0136) 
Post_policy 0.001 0.0033 0.034 0.0056 
 (0.0110) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0112) 
NH expectation*Post_policy -0.0325** -0.0317** -0.0317** -0.0320** 
 (0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0156) 
Demographics N Y Y Y 
Region fixed effects N N Y Y 
Health condition N N N Y 
Observations 8462 8462 8460 8439 
Notes: Sample include financial respondents born in or before 1936, and have responded to the 
question regarding nursing home anticipation in 2004. NH expectation equals one if self-reported 
probability of NH entry is positive, zero if self-reported probability of NH entry is zero. Demographics 
controls include age, age square, educational attainment, gender, race, marital status and number of 
children. Health condition controls include self-reported health condition, difficulties in ADL and 
nursing home utilization dummy. Marginal effects are reported. Standard errors are clustered at 
individual level, reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 
percent, and 10 percent level respectively. 
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Table 3-3: Alternative probability cutoff: 0.1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
NH expectation 0.0648*** 0.0425*** 0.0424*** 0.0446*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0137) 
Post_policy 0.0011 0.0039 0.0039 0.0052 
 (0.0104) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0106) 
NH expectation*Post_policy -0.0368** -0.0367** -0.0367** -0.0376** 
 (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0158) 
Demographics N Y Y Y 
Region fixed effects N N Y Y 
Health condition N N N Y 
Observations 8462 8462 8460 8439 
Notes: Sample include financial respondents born in or before 1936, and have responded to the 
question regarding nursing home anticipation in 2004. NH expectation equals one if self-reported 
probability of NH entry is greater than 0.1, zero if self-reported probability of NH entry is smaller than 
or equal to 0.1. Demographics controls include age, age square, educational attainment, gender, race, 
marital status and number of children. Health condition controls include self-reported health 
condition, difficulties in ADL and nursing home utilization dummy. Marginal effects are reported. 
Standard errors are clustered at individual level, reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * denotes statistical 
significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level respectively. 
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Table 3-4: Alternative probability cut-off: 0.5  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
NH expectation 0.0343* 0.0455** 0.0460** 0.0578*** 
 (0.0181) (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0180) 
Post_policy -0.0075 -0.0051 -0.0050 -0.0040 
 (0.0085) (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0088) 
NH expectation*Post_policy -0.0409** -0.0385** -0.0384** -0.0393** 
 (0.0213) (0.0214) (0.0214) (0.0215) 
Demographics N Y Y Y 
Region fixed effects N N Y Y 
Health condition N N N Y 
Observations 8462 8462 8460 8439 
Notes: Sample include financial respondents born in or before 1936, and have responded to the 
question regarding nursing home anticipation in 2004. NH expectation equals one if self-reported 
probability of NH entry is greater than 0.5, zero if self-reported probability of NH entry is smaller than 
or equal to 0.5. Demographics controls include age, age square, educational attainment, gender, race, 
marital status and number of children. Health condition controls include self-reported health 
condition, difficulties in ADL and nursing home utilization dummy. Marginal effects are reported. 
Standard errors are clustered at individual level, reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * denotes statistical 
significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level respectively. 
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Table 3-5: Subgroup analysis. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Age <=80 Age>80 HS dropouts HS/GED and above Male Female 
NH expectation 0.0405** 0.0243 0.0799*** 0.0230 0.0310 0.0441** 
 (0.0169) (0.0219) (0.0224) (0.0166) (0.0219) (0.0174) 
Post_policy 0.023 -0.0181 0.0124 0.0023 0.0022 0.00673 
 (0.0139) (0.0197) (0.0185) (0.0138) (0.0184) (0.0141) 
NH expectation*Post_policy -0.0445** -0.0125 -0.0481* -0.0279 -0.0366 -0.0297 
 (0.0190) (0.0259) (0.0277) (0.0189) (0.0255) (0.0197) 
Demographics Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Health condition Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 5689 3101 2193 6242 3529 4910 
Notes: Sample include financial respondents born in or before 1936, and have responded to the question regarding nursing home anticipation 
in 2004. NH expectation equals one if self-reported probability of NH entry is positive, zero if self-reported probability of NH entry is zero. 
Demographics controls include age, age square, educational attainment, gender, race, marital status and number of children. Health condition 
controls include self-reported health condition, difficulties in ADL and nursing home utilization dummy. Marginal effects are reported. 
Standard errors are clustered at individual level, reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, 
and 10 percent level respectively. 
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